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l. Introduction

Since 1990, three different U.S. Presidents have accused Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein of comJllitting grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and acts of genocide. 1 Although the Geneva Conventions and the
Genocide Convention require state parties to bring offenders to justice, on the
eve of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, President George W. B.ush offered to call off
the attack if Saddam Hussein and his top lieutenants would agree to relinquish
power and go into e]dle. 2 This vv~s no publicity stunt, as some have
characterized it Working through President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, the
United States actively pursued the matter with several Mideast countries,
ultimately persuading Bahrain to agree to provide sanctmrry to Hussein if hi"c
accepted the deaL 3 '\Nhen Hussein rejected the proposal, Bush promised that
4
illie Iraqi leader vvoukl be forced from power and prosecuted as a war criw.ina!.
Admittedly, thousands of lives could have been spared if Hussein had
accepted the deaL But at the risk of being accused of blindly ernbracing Kant's
prescription that "justice must be done even should the heavens fall," 5 this
I. See Michael P. Scharf, Don't Just Fight Him, Indict Him, L.ft_. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, at
J\111 (recounting Hussein regime's atrocities); Michael JP. Scharf, Can This Man Get a Fair
Trial? \.VASH. PosT, Dec. 19, 2004, at Bl ("[T]here is a mountain of evidence of atrocities
t:0rPJ11itted by Hu~sein!~ reg~rne. ). On July 1, 2004~ Saddan1I"1ussein was arraigned before the
Iraqi Special Tribunal, and informed that he was charged 'Nith (I) rhe systematic kiiling of
religious figures in 1974, which constituted a crime against humanity; (2) killing off the Kurdish
Barzani clan in 1983. which constituted genocide; (3) torturing and ki!!ing members of political
parties over the last thirty years, which constituted a crime against humanity; (4) using chemical
weapons against the K.urds in Halabja in 1988, which constituted a crime against humanity:,
(5) the "fo~nfar' ethnic c1ec~n.!::-~r:g campaign agtiinst ~-:.urds ~!I l937-iS8, vv>hicit constittneQ_
genocide; (6) war crimes during the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, vvhich cons1itutf.d grave. bTe::wh.P.s
of the Geneva Convei1tions; and (7) the drying up of river:)~ killing hundreds of thouscnds 0E
Uicusb .A.rabs in response to their 1991 uprising, which constituted genocide. Charges Facing
5addam Hussein, BBC ]',JEWS, July 1, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/332D293.
stm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
11

2. See Julian Borger, Diplomacy Dies, Now jt' s War: Bush Gives Saddam and h.'is So;!s
:.;1.8 _Hours ro L£ave lraq or :.c;'ace !vlassiv£ J11ilittli)' Onslattghi. GUARDJAN (LONDON\ lVlar. 18;
~~oo:;~ at 1 (describing President Bush\~ exile offer).
3. .Em.ily Wa;~, Arab Leaders FaiT in Last Minute Efforts: Mubcrak Blames Iraq,
·Cal!tions Coalition: Bahrain Signals that it H'ould Give lfussein Sanctt!OlJI~ V;f ASH. PosT, h1:ar.
2C, 2D03, at A21.
4. Richard 'N. Stevenson, Threats m1d Responses: The .President; Bush Gives Hussein
48 Hours, and Vows to Act, l'l.Y. Tlli1ES, lV!ar. 18, 2003, at 1.
5. IMMANUEL KANT,. TB£ METAPHYSICS OF f'10RALS ltl.). (l1.ilm:: Gregor t:-an8., Camt.ridge
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Article argues that it was inappropriate for the Bush Adnlinistraiion even to
make the offer, and that if implemented the exile-for-peace deal would have
seriously underrrilned the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention,
which require prosecution of alleged offenders without exception.
A few months after the invasion of Iraq, U.S. officials helped broker a deal
whereby Liberian President Charles Taylor, who had been indicted for crimes
against humanity by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, agreed to give up
power and was allowed to flee to 1\Tigeria, where he received asylum. 6 At t.he
time, forces opposed to Taylor, which had taken over most of the country, were
on the verge of attacking the capitaJ city Monrovia, and tens of th.o11sands of
civilian casualties were forecast. The exile dea~ averij:ed the crisis and set the
stage for insertion of a U.N. peacekeeping mission that stabilized the country
and set ii on a path to peace and democracy. 7 liil contrast to the Hussein case,
the Taylor arrangement did not in any way violate international law. This
fo.Iticle exp!ains '.Vhy imemctional !.aw should treat 1the il:wo sih]a1tions
differently, prohibiting exile and asylum for Saddam Hussein while permitting
such a justice-for-peace exchange in the case of Charles Taylor.
This is the first scholarly article in recent years to focus on the significant
issue of exile. Scholarship on the analogous issue of amnesty has been written
largely from the point of view of aggressive advocates of international justice,
~Nhcsc ~.nriting its based on the assumption ttait the vvidesr:iread state practice
favming am_Desties constitl~tes a v]olation of, ]·ather than il reflection of.
intemational1avv' in this area. 8 Before analyzing the relevant legal principles,
1991) (1785).
6. Ryan JLizza, Charles at Large, NEW REPUBLIC Apr. 25, 2005, at 10.
7. ld.
3. See IVl. CHER!F BASSnOUNl, CRIMES AGA!i,IST HUIVIANJTY IN KNTERNATIONALLAW, 492,
500-01 {1.992) (arguing th.~t there is an inten1atic;u~l dut:,• t·J pr0s~.c~:.rt,~ o~- c;~ti'f•.dilc those \;v-bo
<"::onnnit crirn.es against humanity); Leiia l'·ladya SadEt, UniPersal }urisdictioi1: iJatiana/
Arnnesties= and Truth Conunissions:

Reconciling the hTecorzciiable, in UNIVERSAL

JURISDICTION:
HAT!ONAL COURTS Al'lD Tl-l.E PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 194-201 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2003) (arguing that aw..nesties create a

11 incompatible V.'ith intem~ticnn1 jt:tsticc); I-lL Chei·if :Sassiounil
''c;.~lture of impurrity
lnt<!matioilal Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59lLAW &CONTElvJP. PROBS. 63,
63 (1996) (arguing that stales have an obligation w prosecute jus cogens crimes); Carl:l
Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?, 7 LE!DEi'-1 J.lNT'LL. 5, l"!- (!994)
(noting U.N.'s affirmation of duty to prosecute ··.var crimes); Diane F. Orent!icbl'!r, Settling
Account: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violaiions of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE LJ.
2.537, 2585,2593 (l99l) (eJlplaining that analysts interpret law generated by the Nuremberg
trials, and U.N. actions ratifying that law, to "require punishment of crimes against humanity");
Naomi Robt-Arriaza, Stare Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Riehts
Violations in lntemational Law, 78 CALL REV. 451, 461 (1990) (urging the necessii:y of an
international duty to investigate grave human violations).
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fhe Artide begins with an exar-nination of the practical cons1derations that
counsel for and against the practice of "trading justice for peace." Next, using
the Saddam Hussein and Charles Taylor cases as a focal point, the Article
analyzes the relevant intemational instruments which require prosecution under
lin1ited circumstances. This is followed by a critique of the popular view that
customary international law and the principle of jus co gens broadly prohibit
actions that prevent prosecution of crimes under international law. The Article
establishes that there does not yet exist a customary international law mle
requiring prosecution of war crimes in internal anned conflict or crimes agai11st
humanity, but that there is a duty to prosecute in the case of grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions, lhe crime of genocide, and torture. ·where the duty to
prosecu~e does apply, it is important that states and international organizations
honor it, fest they signal disrespect for the important treaties from which the
duty arises, potentially putting their own citizens at risk and generaHy
lJll1Kienmning the mle of law.
fl. Practical Considerations
A. Interests Favoring Exile, Asylum, and Amnesty

r,JoQvvithstanding the populai! catch pr«ase: of ihe J!.990s-"no peace
without justice"-achieving peace and obtaining justice are sometimes
incompatible goals-at least in the short term. In order to end an international
or intem£:] conflict, negotiatiotr:~s oflten mus~ be held! with the verj leaders who
are respom;ible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. When this is the
case, insisting on criminal prosewtions can pro]ong the conflict, resulting in
more deaths, destruction, and human suffering. 9
Reflecli:ing i:his reality, during the past thirty years, AlillgoTia, A.rgentlina,
18nilzit Cambodia, Chilie, El SaJvador, Guatemala, Hmtli, Hondll!ras, Jlvory
Coast, NicaragiLia, lP'em, Sien-a Leone, South Africa, Togo, and Uli'uguay have
e;:iH;;h, .as part of a peace am:ulligement, granted arrrnesity to members of the former
•
I~
.
d .
.
l
•
. I .
•J •
.
b d
10
regnme
ttu<:~J com..illliHe. mtematwnaR cnmes w1tnm wen- respect!'/e or .ers.

S'. As an anonymous government official stated in an oft-quoted articie: "The quest for
justice for yesterday's victims of atrocities should not be pursued in such a manner that it makes
today' s living the dead of tomorrow." Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18
X""'lUM. RTS. Q. 249, 258 (1996).
10. See Steven Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An lnquil~l' in International
Law, 87 GEO. l..J. 707, 722-23 ( 1999) (mentioning the governments in transitional democracies
that have passed amnesty laws); Roht-A.rriaza, supra note 8, at 461 (noting grants of amnesty in
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Gm1tema!a, and El S<>lvac!or); Michael P. Schmf, The Letter ofthe
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With respect to five of these countries-Cambodia, EI Salvador, Haiti, Sierra
Leone, and South Africa-"the United Nations itself pushed for, helped
negotiate, or endorsed the granting of amnesty as a means of restoring peace
'
.
,]]
an d aemocratlc government.
In addition to ainnesty (which immunizes the perpetrator from domestic
prosecution), exile and asylum in a foreign country (which puts the perpetrator
12
out of the jurisdictional reach of domestic prosecution) is often used to induce
regime change, with the blessing and involvement of significant states and the
United Nations. Peace negotiators caU this the "Napoleonic Option," in
reference to the treatment of French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte who, after
his defeat at V\1 ater1oo in 1815, was exiled to St Helena rather than face trial or
execution. 13 I<v1ore recently, a number of dictators have been granted sanctuar-y
abroad in retum for relinquishing power. Thus, fm example, Ferdinand Marcos
fled the Philippines for Hawaii; Baby Doc Duvalier fled Haiti for France;
lVIengisthu Haile Miriam fled Ethiopia for Zirnbabwe; Kd.i A.min fled Uganda
for Saudi Arabia; General RaouL Ce:dras fled Haiti for Panama; and Cbcrles
Taylor fled Liberia for exile in Nigeria-a deal negotiated by the United States
14
and U.N. envoy Jacques KJein.
As Pay am Akhann, then Legal! Adviser to the Office of ~he Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Fonner Yugoslavia, absented a
decc:de ago: "[K]t is not l.ml.llst.m!. in !the political stage to see ~he rnet:amorphosis
of yesterday's war monger into today' s peace broker. "15 This is because, unless
the international community is willing to use force to topple a rogue regime,
cooperation of the leaders is needed to bring about peaceful regime change and.
put an end to violations of international humanitarian law. Yet, it is not
realistic to expect them to agree to a peace settlement if, directly foHowing ~he
Law: The Scope c~(the lntemational Legal Obligation io P'rosecme Human Rights O·imc:s, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. !PROBS . .q.], 4-! 0 996) (discussing these cot.mtries' am.11.esty programs).
ll. Scharf, supra note 10, at '-H.
12. In cases of exile, the state wbere the offense occurred (the territorial state) cannot
commence proceedings as it does not have physical custody over the accused, and the sanctuary
state is generally prevented from prosecuting or extraditing by the doctrine of head of state
lrillTtunity. See, e.g., Regir1a ~v. Bvv-.; ~t. 1\lletrG. ~tipendiw-:-y r.1agi~trate, ::;; partz P'inochet Ugart~
(No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 242 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.) (noting that the doctrine "protects all acts
which the head of state has pedormed in the exercise of the functions of government").

13. MICHAEL F. SCHARF, BALKP.J~ JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHJNDTHEF'IRSTlNTERNAT!ONAL
WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE i'-lURE!viBERG 5 (1997).
lL!-. See Davs Gilson, The Exile Files, 2.003 (Ang. 2], 2003), http://wwv<.globa!
policy.org/intljustice/generai/2003/0826exile.htm (discussing the exile arrangements of more
than a dozen individuals).
15. Payam Akhavan, The Yugosiav Tribunai at a Cross;·oads: The Dayton Peace
Agreement and Beyond, ! g HuM. RTs. Q. 259, 271 (1996).
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agreement, they wou]d find themselves m their close associates facing potential
life imprisonment
This conclusion findE support in the observations of the 2004 JR.eport of
the Kntemational Truth and Reconciliation Comt-nission for Sierra Leone:
The Commission i.s unable to condemn the resort to amnesty oy those
who negotiated the Lome Peace Agreement [which provides amnesty to
persons who committed crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone]. The
explanations given by the Goverwuent negotiators, including in their
testimonies before the Truth and Reconciliation Comrn.ission, are
compelling in this respect. In all good faith, they believed Lhat the RUF
[insurgents] would not agree to end hostilities if the Agreement 'Nere not
acconnpanied by a fom] of pBxdon or arrtnesty.

Th~: CvrH<iussion is unable l:o declare that it considers arn..nesty too high
a price to pay for the delivery of peace to .Sierra Leone, under the
circumstances thai prevailed in July 1999. Kt is true that the Lome
Agreement did not immediately return the country to peacetime. Yet it
rro'.rided the framevmrk for a pro!:ess that pacified \he combatants and, fi'ie
years later, has returned Sierra Leoneans to a context in which they need
not fear daily violence and atrocity. 16

In bmkering the Charles Taylor exile deal, the United States and United
l'Ta!:ions were particularly encouraged by the success of similar amnesty/exile
for peace: 211-:rangemeu.ts rdatnng to Hailti and South Africa in the 1990s. From
1990-:1.994, Haiti was mled by a military regime headed by General Raoi
Cedras and Brigadier Genera] JP'hi!ippe Biamby, which execljted over 3000
civiha!1 poHtical oppollients and tortured scores of others.l7 The United Nations
mediated negotiations at Govemors Isl<md in Ne~<v ~i{ ork Harbor, ]n wh~ch the
nrnil]1tary li~a.der::. Btgreed ~o relll1lllC]11JJl]~t1 pn,:ver snd pernillt \~EJ1e retu~-r;. ::;f ·~h~:
democratkaHy eiec[erdilP'resk!lent (Jean-Bertnmcl Aristide) in xetJ.m'l! for <! fnH

ECIG1esty fOr ~he r~i~ten1bf;rs of the regllm.e and a Hfti~·Bg of the econorrric scnH~llions
i:mpose<Cl by the U.T..J. Security Counci1. 18 Under pressure frorn d1e Un]ted
l 6.

3H

V./!Ti'!ESS TO TRUTH: k?.EPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION

365 (2004), quoted in 1)\lilliam A. Schabas, Amnesty, rhe Sierra Leone Trl!th and
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Couri'for Sierm Leone, !1 U.C. DAVIS J. ill'iT'LL. &
PoL'Y 14-5, 163-64 (2004-). Schabas, the Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights, was a
member of the !nternat.ionai Truth Cornmission for Sierra JLeone.
COlvlMlSSION

17. See Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: lVas There n Duty zo Prosecute
lntemational Criilles in Haiti?, 3! TEX. liNT'L L.J. l, 4-5 (1996) (describing human rights
violations documented by the U.S. Department of State and various human rights groups).
H>
'o. See The Secretary-General, The Situation of Democracy and Hwnan Rights in Haiti,
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Nations mediators, Aristide agreed to the arr...."lesty clause of the Governors
Island Agreement. 19 The Security Council immediately "declared [its]
1eadiness to give the fullest possible support to the Agreement signed on
Governors Island,." 20 which it later said constitutes "the only valid framework
.r
]
•
r
h
. . • 7V • • n2J nrh
>1-.
·r
1 ..:1
•
• • 1'
wr th~
;:·eso~utwn or Le cns1s m nmt!.
v•. -"en tue
:rr>J,!t~ry _eauers rmt!a 1y
failed to comply with the Governors Island Agreement, on July 31, 1994, the
Security Council took L~e extreme step of authorizing an invasion of Haiti by a
multinational force. 22 On the eve of the invasion on September 18, 1994, a deal
-was struck, whereby General Cedras agreed to retire his command and accept
exi1e in response to a genentl amnesty voted into lavv by the Haitian parliarnent
c~
-· J: ·
-1
~J
anc;" an one:i'
by lt-'anama
to prov1d.t
~mn asy1um.The amnesty deal had its desired effect The democratically elected
Aristic!e was permitted to return to Haiti and reinstate a civilian government;
the nnlitary leaders left the country for sanctuary in Panama, much of the
military sunendered. their arms, and most of the human rights abuses promptly
4
el~ded-aH 'Nith practically no bloodshed or res:istance? Although the
~:jtuation in Haiti has once: again deteriorated, with a ·wave of violei1t protests
and strikes erupting in 2004, the more recent problems were due largely to
President Aristide's mismanagement and comJptio:n, not the fact tlut the
·-1·
1_eac:ers
l
· hment ten years eaL!er.1· rys
D1Ui.?,ry
escapeur~ pums_
U.H. Doc. S/26063, AJ47/975 (July 12, 1993) (reproducing the text of the Governors Island
i•~greement). The Governors Island Agreement was supplemented oy a document known as the
i'k•v York Paci. which was signed by the two sides on July 16, 1993. Paragraph 4 of the New
York Pact provides that "[t]he political forces and parliamentary blocs undertake to ensure that
;:he: -fallowing laws are passed. on the bases of an emergency procedure: ... (ii) Act concerning
i:hf a_i_·rm~sty. ~~ The Secretary-()eneraL The Siruation of.Denioci·acy and }{unuin. Rights in linili
~Em·::o.1[4, :;_ul. Doc. S/26297, ?J47/IOOO (Aug. 13, 1993).
I 9. See lrwin F. Stolzky, Haiti: Searching for Altemmives, in IMPUI'I!TY AND HUMM!
T~JGHT~: iN li·~TERHATfC:NAL ~n Vv' AND PRACTICE i gg (I"JaoiTti f.~oht-iirfiaza eci.~ 1S"'S 5) (describing
f::.J:i2'.fide's 'Jpposi~1on lo gn:lnting arrn1esty to '',::orY!lY!.OI! cl·irninHls" H.nd his uhi1T1aie t:::~tpitu]Htion
1

i;·~

tfv: facs of tre:rnendous pressure). Professor Stutzky of the Un1vcrsity of f/Iiami

Schno~

of

La•P served as Aristide's legal adviser while A.ristide was in exile in the United Stales.
~!.G.
Letter f;:om the PreDident of the Security ·Council to the S.ecretary-(JenerD.l~ ~J.I'l
:~(:\)R, ci8th Sess. at 120, U.N. Doc. S/lil'JF/49 (July 15, 1993).
'}I
Staternent of the President of the Sec:ur!ty r2ouncH, ~JJ·!. 2.rCOR, ~~!.8ih Se~s., 3293th
mtg. at 126, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (Oct. 25, 1993).
22 S.C. R~s. 940, 1[4, U.N. Doc. S/i'ES/940 (July 3], !99,!).
')·:~
h7aitian Lawrnaker:; Pass Partial .Anznesty to .Pressure C'ec!ras, ('cnvnvL P;,.PPEAL
~)JI::-rnphi~~)~ ·Dct. 3: 1994, at .!~~1.
~4.
See h1aggie O'I(ane, After the YGHks J-lal'e Gone, GUARDIAN (LCtndon), Feb. Jg,] 995~
c;l /"i· (deSC!ibing Aristide's generally peaceful return to power).
~5.
International Crisis ~Group, A j'leH' C:hance for .r-Jaiti?, !nteruational~Crisis '\_:tt.)t!p
}c.epvrl He.. 10, 7-11 (l'·lov. 1 fl, 2004).
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South P:..f~ic:c. stands as another SEC(;t::ss sto~y, in.dico.ting the potential \'a.lue
of trading jus~jce for peace. l 1rom 1960 to 1994; thousands of b1ack South
Africans ·were persecuted and mistreated under that country's apartheid system.
~With the prospect of a bloody civil war looming over negotiations, "[t]he
C)Utgaing l~aderE n.1ade some form of a_rfu!esty for those responsible for the
'
'
~
1.
fu'
£:
.r: -'
·
·
n°6
reg1me
a con d':stron
A
or il:n1e
peace~ .T;! trans1er to a .PJHj' aemocr2.tic soc1et)'- The !eaders of the majmity black population decided that the commitment to
afford anmesty was a fair price for a relatively peaceful transition to fdl
democracy. 27 Xn accordance vvith the negotiated settlement between the major
parties, on July 19, 1995, the South African Parliament created a nfruth and
Reconciliation Con11.--nission, consisting of a Cor£mtittee on Human Rights

'\1iola.tions . a. l[;or.Thl.rn~iuee on Jli::.rn_nesty~ and a Conwlittee on P._eparation ~nd
Rehabi!itation. 28 Under this process, arrmesty would be available on!y to
individuals vvho personally applied for it and who disdosed fully the facts of
their apartheid crimes. After conducting 140 public hearings and considering
20,000 written and. oral submissions, the South African Truth Commission
. ". "
~
.
~
-.
b ~LY,
- n 1~ o:ro
puD·Hsl1e:ct
a .!.r ,.,/ .Y:}-page
report or~ rts
JIIndirngs
oB (i~Jcto~·e.r
_.., :.;o_--~ T_·:.11.r.o~·~
observers believe the amnesty in South Af1ica headed off incieasing tensions
and a potential civil vvar.
it is a common rr'lisconception that ~rading amnesty or exile for peace is
,stJEivaient to the ~bsence of 21.ccmmtabilitv ;:nnd rerh·P:ss 30 As in the Haitian and
~~olL!!th AJI-ican situ3:tion1ls described above anr1nestties can be tied t~J
accountability mechanisms ithat are less invasive i:han domestic or international
prosecution. Ever more frequently in the aftermath of an &HJJ.I1esty- or exile-forpeace d.eai, d'ie corncemed1 govennneRlS have made mone!BJ}' reparat]ons to the
'lictim~ arnd their f;:umlies, established! truth r:o1nwjssioEl!s to document the
8Jbuses (8XJ.d sonltet]nl!es idlerrdfy perpetrators by nanne)~ Lu1d have
eRnploym~.::nt bans and purges (refeHed to as
") 1tb2Jt l~eep ~uch
OQ
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~---,)
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---

-·--

-

9

.
.
P
•
perpecn:nors
..n.ron1
posEUOlllis
or~ pu.b,_]c t1ru.nst 31
c•

r;,::;

17.
28.
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•
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rhot

t~1e ~~arne
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T

c:rr.tTB.Inc~:.
•
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!d. at 55.
l"'lationc.l Unity and Reconci]1D.tion A.ct 34- of J.99.:J §§ 2~ 12 . 16 /J!.. 23.

The te;ct of the South P1.frican Truth Cor.o.Er!:issior!' s ]Report is a:vailable on the Ini.ernet

r:l ··N\~'''~'.info.gov .za/o(herdocs/2003/trc.

30. Sec ·,:.ViHiam Vti. Burke-'\ltfhite, Hefh:uning ];npunity: Applying Liberallnfenuiiional
Lnn-' Tht:oi~,, ;o an Anof_vsis of A.rnnesty Legislation~ 42 ~'-.!1ARV. Xr-.JT'L LJ. 467. 482 (2001)
(clnssifying arnnesties into fonr categories~ from lea.st tc n1ost legitimate: (l) ''Blanker
P._n1lv:stiesll; (2) L8caHy Legiti1n.ized~ Parti8] Kminunitles:~; (3) "Enternat]ona!ly Legitin1i2.ed:
11

Panial !mn1unities~~~ and (L!.) l!Constitutional Kn1muniti
31. i'JAOlVll ROHT-ARR!AZA, Kh1PUNlTY AND HUivlAI'i
!PRACTICE 282-91(1995).
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prosecution, these mechanisms do encompass much of -what justice is intended
to accomplish: prevention, deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation. lindeed,
some experts believe that these mechanisms do not just constitute "a second
best approach" when prosecution is impracticable, but that in many situations
they may be better suited to achieving the aims of justice. 32

B. Factors Favoring Prosecution
Although providing amnesty and exile to perpetrators may be a_n effective
\vay to induce regime change without having to resort to force, th.ere are severa]
important cm:mtervailing considerations favoring prosecui':ion that suggest
amnesty/exile should be a bargaining tool of last resort reserved only for
extreme situations. In particular, prosecuting leaders responsible for violations
of international humanitarian law is necessary to discourage future human
rights abuses, dei:er vigilante justice, and reinforce respect for law and the new
democratic government.
\1\/hile prosecutions rrllight initially provoke resis~ance, many analiysts
believe that national reconciliation cannot take place as Xong as justice is
foreclosed. As Professor Cherif Bassiouni, then ChainiJ.an of the U.N.
Investigative Commission for Yugoslavia, stated in 1996, "[i]f peace is not
intended to be a brief interlude between conflicts," U:hen it must be accompalOl]ed
-·
. . .
31
by JUStice. Failure to prosecute leaders responsible for huma.n rights abuses breeds
contempt for the law and encourages future violations. The U.N. Commission
on Human Rights and! its Sub-Commission on Prevention ofDiscri.roination311d!
Protection of lv1[inorities have conchi!dedl that imp1.mity is one of the main
reasons for the contiml!ation of grave violations oHmmalDl rights throughout the
34
'Norld.
Fact finding reports on Chile and JEJ SaJvadlor indlkate that tlhe

grarHing of mrmesty or de facto iJr!!1p1Jnilty lhe;s Red! to an increase in abuse::: i.n
those cmmtries. 35
31. S::e I\t£IJ·JC'l1, :;~.~pra note 26, u.t g (contending th&t prosecu:ticn:; "arc slo\~v', pwtln1, and
narrow").
33. l'vf. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for
Accoumabi/ity, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 13 (1996).
34. UJ-L Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, WorkingGmup
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Report on the Consequences of Impunity,'][ 34-4,
U.N. Doc. E/Cl\1.41!990/13 (Jan. 24, 1990), reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 18, 19 (l\1. Kritz ed., 1995).
35. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Protection of Human Rights in Chile,'][ 341,
U.N. Doc. AJ38/385 (Oct 17, 1983).
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Further, history teaches that fonner leaders given am.nesty or exile are
prone to recidivism, resorting to corruption and violence and becoming a
disn.rprivt in:t1uence on the peace process. From his seasiae villa ia Ca.iabar,
Nigeric;, for e;c?.mp!e, Charles Taylor orchestrated a failed &ssassinal:ion plot in
2005 against President Lansana Conte of Guine&., a neighboring country tba~
had backed the rebel movement that forced Taylor from power. 36
VVhat a fleW or reinstated democracy needs mosi is legitimacy, which
requires a fair, credible, and transparent account of what wok place and vvho
was responsible. Criminal trials (especially those involving proof of
widespread and systematic abuses) can generate a comprehensive record ofthe
nature and extent of violations, how they were planned and executed, the f::;te.
of individual victims, who gave the orders, and who carried them out. ")lhilc
there are various means to develop the historic record of such ::tbuses, the mos:
authoritative rendering of the truth is possible only through the crucible nf a
trial that accords fuli due process. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jaclc:;s:;,, th:::
Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, underscored the logic of this proposition vvhen
he repmied that the most importa..11t legacy of the Nuremberg trials was the
documentation of Nazi atrocities "with such authenticity and in wch dst::>il th2t
!here can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future. "37 According
to Jackson, the est<lbiishment of an authoritative record of 8.busts th;:,~ \;,iu•jld
endure the test of time and vvithstand the challenge of revisionisrn required
proof of "incredible events by credible evidence. "38
In addition to truth, there is a responsibility to provide justice. ·while ::,
Slat:e nw.y appropr.iatdy forgive crimes against itself, such as treason or sedition,.
serious crimes against persons, such as rape a!i1d murder, are an altogethe:ldlifferent matter. Holding the violators accow"!talblr:: for their acts is a ml:lr3l duty
ovv·ed to the victims and! "their fanrili.es. Prosecuting and ptmio.hing l11e 'iiol.cSo:ts
1~ould give sign]f]cance to the victims~ suffering and serve 2s .2 p.Br~i.BJ :F::Yr:t::d.~/
lGo! their ]njuries. IVJioreover~ prosecutions help res~ore -·.,;ict~ros; d·!gni~y .~~nd

36. See Lizzti, supra note 6~ at 1G (citing an intelligence repon prepared by ir~vestigatDr:;
for the ::;pecial Cour< for Sierra Leone). In response, the U.N. Security Council adopted
P.e~c.;lution I 532~ v~:hich required an states to freeze Charles Tay!or~s assets in order to pr':'.:vent
him from further engaging "in activities that undermine peace and stability in Liberia and the
region." S.C. Res. 1532, pmbl.. U.H. Doc. S/RES!l532 (l\llar. 12, 2004).

37. Repon from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the tJr;ited :::.t?J::s in the
Prosecution or Axis V.far Criminals, to the President (Oct. 7, 1946), in 20 TEMPLE L.Q. 338,. 2·'-!3
(] 946).
38. Report from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States in the
Prosecution of Axis War CrimJnals, to the President (June 7, 1945), in 39 P.J,1. J. IN~''- L 172,
184 (Supp. 1945).
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prevent private acts of revenge by those who, in the absence of justice, would
take it into their own hands. 39
While prosecution and punishment can reinforce the value of law by
displacing personal revenge, failure to punish former leaders responsible for
widespread human rights abuses encourages cynicism about the rule of law
and distrust toward the political system. To the victims of human rights
crimes, an:tiJ.esty or exile represents the ultimate in hypocrisy: While they
struggle to put their suffering behind them, those responsible are allowed to
enjoy a comfortable retirement. When those with power are seen to be 'tbove
the iaw, the ordinary citizen win never come to believe nn tthe principle of the
rule of law as a fundamental necessity in a society transitioning to
democracy.
fiilaHy, vvhere the United Nations or major countries give their
imprimatur to an amnesty or exile deal, ~here is a risk that leaders lin odner
parts cf the v;;orld wm be encouraged to engage in gross abuses. lFm
example, history records that the international amnesty given to the Turkish
officials responsible for the massacre of over one minion Armenians during
Wvrld Wax 1 encouraged Ado]f Hider some twenty years later to conclude
that Germany could pursue his genocidal policies with impunity. In a 1939
speech to his reh1ctant Genera! :Staff, Hitler remarked, "Who after aH is today
speaking about the destrucdon of the Armenians?" 40 Richard Goldstone, the
former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the forrner
Y Egosl11viE.J., bas conduded that "the faihue of the international[ comrnunity to
prosecute lPollPot, Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein and Moh.arilimed Aididl, among
others, encouraged the Serbs to launch their policy of ethnic cleansing in tliie
former Yugosbvia with the expe:ctaition !thai: tlhey would noli: be held
accmmtabk :for their ]ntemationa~ criKI]eS. "41 Vvhen the intemationaK
·~·~~~~:ruun~ty e:Jteo~_rr:2J_ge:s .f.)t GH(lorscs an EiTICUll1Csty D,&' e;~jlic deal~ i~ seunds a .signa]
tc other rogicle regirnes Ihai: they !fllave no([Jhilllig Ito ]ose by nns~ituiciRng repressive
measures; if things start going !bad]y, ~hey can allways bargain aw<J>.y therr
:;_·tsponsioHity for crimes by agreeing to peace.

39. Haitian citizens, for e:xample, have commitietl acts of violence agai!!1st the fonnc;;·
members of the brutal military regime who were given amnesty for their abuses. Gary Borg,
F o:·;.~~q:·,. Haitian Gc:n:!ta! i;;· Chtaned Do-wn in Streei~ Cl-!1. TRIB., Oct ·4, ! 995, at 4.
40. Adolf Hitler, Speech to Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals (Aug. 22.,
1939), quoted in M. CHERIF l3ASSIOUNI, CRIIVJES AGAINST HUMANITY IN lNTER[,lAT!ONAL
CRJMINALLAW 176 n.96 (]992).
L.} l.
Ivnichac1 Scharf, Th.e ~Case for a .Pennunent lnrei··nationci Tn1.th C'oiiliEission, '/ D~uE.E
J. ·C:OMP. & INT'LL. 375, 393 ii1.128 (1997).
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lll. The Limited International Legal Obligation to Prosecute
a few narrovvly defined situations (described below) there is an
internationaliegal obligation to prosecute regard!ess of the underlying practical
considerations. Where this is the case, failure to prosecute can amount to an
international breach. An ami'lesty or asylum given to the members of the
former regime could be invalidated in a proceeding before either the state's
42
domestic courts or an international forum. 43 International support for such an
amn.esty or asylum deal would undermine international respect for and
adherence to the treaties that require prosecution. Finally, it would be
inappropliate for an international criminal court to defer to a national amnesty
or asylum in a situation vvhere the anmesty or asylum violates obligations
conte2ined in the very international conventions that make up the court's subject
matter jurisdiction.
lL11

A. Crimes Defined in International Conventions

i~ .

The prerogative of states to issue fu! am_nesty or grant asylum for an
offense can be circumscribed by treaties to which the states axe party. There are
several international conventions that dearly provide for a du[y to prosecute the
humanitaxian or human 1ights crimes defined therein, including in particular the
grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 44 the Genocide
6.?
When the South A..frican amnesty scheme was challenged on the grounds that it
violated the rights of families to seek judicial redress for the murders of !heir loved ones, the
newly created Constitutional Court rejected the claim on the ground that neither the South
African Constituiion nor any applicable treaty prevented granting amnesty in exchange for truth.
Se-e f~:anian Peoples ()rg. 11. Presidei1t ofS. Afr. 1996 (4) S/\ 671 (C'C) ~f 50 (0. J\:f!.), G·~~.:;.ilc.!I:/~
at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/2529.PDF ("[T]he epilogue to the
Constitution authorised and contemplated an 'am.nesty' in its most comprehensive and generous
meaning."). A chailenge to the Argentinian amnesty law fared better. In fv'iarch 2001, an
Argentinian judge declared the amnesty law unconstitutional and in violation of internation<:>.!
lavi, e1 decision confirmed in P:,ugust 2003 vvhen .AJgentina's Parlimnent voted to a:1nul tb:::
amnesty law. Debora Rey, Argentina Approves Ending Laws on Amnesty, VI/ASH. POST, Aug.
2'2, 2003, at A.16. As this P..sticle went to press, a lawsuit was winding its way through the
courts of Nigeria, seeking to strike down the asylum granted to Charles 'faylor on the ground
that it violated Nigeria's obligations under international and domestic law to prosecute and deny
asylum to perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. James A. Goldston, Some
Quiet Victories for Human Rights, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 22, 2005, at 3.
43. "Challenges to amnesty laws enacted in Argentina, El Salvador, Suriname, and
Uruguay have been lodged with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the
Organization of American States." Diane F. Orentlicher, Set!ling Accounts: The Duty to
,"'rose ewe FhiiiWn Rights Fiolaiions of a Friar Regime, IOO YALE L..i. 2537, 2540 n.5 (1991 ).
44. Geneva Convention for the A~rnelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
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Convention, and the Torture Convention.
Vvhen these Conventions are
applicable, the granting of anmesty or asylum to persons responsible for
cominitting the crimes defined therein would constitute a breach of a treaty
obiigation for which there can be no excuse or exception. H is noteworthy,
however, that these Conventions were negotiated in the context of the Cold
War and by design apply only to a na.rrow range of situations, as such
limitations were necessary to ensure widespread adoption.

1. The 1949 Geneva Conventions
The four Geneva Conventiolills were negotiated in 1949 to codify, inter
alia, the international rules relating to the treatment of prisoners of war and
civilians dming am1ed conflict and in occupied tenitory after a war. Almost
every country of the world is party to these conventions. Each of the Geneva
Conventions contains a specific enumeration of "grave breaches," whidht are
war climes under international ]aw for which there is individual crirrlJinaM
liability and for which states have a conesponding duty to prosecute or
extradite. Grave breaches include willful killing, torrure or inhumru1 trearnnent,
wiHfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, extenslive
desi:ruction of property not justified by rrulitary necessity, willf11.illy depriving a
civilian of the Iights of fair and regular trial, &.i!d un!awful confinement of a
47
civilian.
lP'lli""ties to the Geneva Conventions have an obligation to search for,
prosectJte,. and punish perpetmtors of grave breaches of tlhe Ge!D!e'm
O:mveR1tions, or to hand over Sl.lclhl persons for trial by another sli:ate parity. The
in P...rmed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12., 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Ger!eva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the A.rne!ioration of the Com!ition of th"\7Jounded, Sick aDd Shipwrecked Members of Armed !Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
IJ.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention H]; Geneva Convention Relative
tc tbe Treatmer;t ofPrisor;ers of War art. 129, Aug. 12, J9t!8, 6 U.S. 'f. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention HI]; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention !V].
45. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Ctime of Genocide art liV, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
46. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, InJmman or Degrading Treatment or
i3 unishment art. 7, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. I\fo. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. l 13, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 LL.M. 535 (1984) (entered
into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
47. Geneva Convention I, supra note 4-4, art. 50; Geneva Convention H, sZJpra !iiO!e -<!t!.,
art. 51; ~Geneva ~convention ~I[, sL!prC! note 4Lt-, art. ~ 30; Geneva Convention K\l,. supra note !!..tJ~
art. 1L~.7.
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Corrnnentc;.ry to the Geneva Conventions, which :is the official hisl':ory of the
negotiations leading to the adoption of these treaties, confirms that the
obligation to prosecute grave breaches is "absolute," meaning, inter alia, thai:
state parties can under no circumstances grant perpetratots iw_munity or
r
·
r
•
t..
r<
•
48
amnesty xrom
prosecutwn
ror
grave -breaches
o_f t•ne
t..'o:nvenuons.
It is important to recognize that while states or international tribunals may
prosecute persons -v:;ho commit war crimes in internal armed conflicts, t!Je duty
to prosecute grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions is limited to the
context of international armed conflict. Further, there is a high threshold of
violence necessa:oy to constitute a genuine mmed conflict, as distinct from lovver
]eve! disturbances such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of fighting, or
unilateral abuses coint-nitted by a government in the absence of widespread
armed resistance by the target population. 49 Moreover, to be an international
.Brmed conflict, the situation must constitute an armed conflict involving two or
more states, Of a partial or toLal occupation of the territory of one state by
2,nother.

50

In contrast ito the duty to prosecute grave breaches occuning in an
international anned conflict, with respect to internal armed conflict amnesties
are not only permitted, but are encouraged by Article 6(5) of Additional
51
Protocol IK -a point the South African Constitutiorl3J Court stressed i!r
finding that the arn.11esties granted by the Truth and Reconciliation CmrLmission
48.

VIRGINIA MORRIS

& MICHAEL P.

SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNAT!Ol>!Al

CRllvl!NALCOURTFORTHEFORMEP. YUGOSUV!i'.

114-15 & n.356, 34·1 (1995) (quoting GENEVA

CONVENTION FOR THE PJ\1ELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED
FORCES U~ THE FIELD: COMMENTARY 373, cmt.

to art. 51 (J. l?ictet eel.,] 952)); see also THEODOR
2!0 (1989) (noting
rhat the universality principle of jurisdiction, on which the grave breaches clauses of the <Geneva
Conventions are based, requires states to prosecute or extradite those charged with committing
grave breaches).
49. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. !949, and Relating to
th<5 lt.'mtection of Victims of Non-linternational P.,.rmed Conflicts (Protocol H) art. 1(2), Jlune B,
l S77, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol H) (stating that the Protocol "shall
noi apply to siruations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots [and] isolated and
sporadic acts of violence
Bltt see Iv11chae] P. Scbart De_firzing Terrori::;n aa lhe ~Peacei.iiiiC
Equi11alent ofWa;· Crimes: Problems and Prospects, 36 CASEW. REs. J.JNT'LL. 359, 365-67
(2004) (citing the Inter-American Comznission on Human Rights' 1997 decision in}tWI1 Carlos
Abeiia v. Arge;1tiiw, Case 1 Ll37, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V /U.?8,
doc. 6 rev. 1['l! 155-56 (!997), and the United States response to the 9/l i attacks as
developments that have sought to lower the armed conflict threshold).
50. Geneva Conventions I, H, HI, and rv, supra note 44, art. 2.
5 i. Additional Protocol H, supra note 49, art. 6(5) ("At the end of hostilities, the
authoriries in power shall endeavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons vvho have
participated in the armed con:t1ict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the
anned conflict, wnether they are intemed or detained.").
iVIERON, HUMAN RIGHTS /J-10 HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW
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did not violate international 1aw.
The rationale for this prov1swn is to
encourage reconciliation, which is of greater importance in nonintemational
armed conllicts where patrolable international borders do not exist between
former enemies. Thus, the Commentary on the Protocol, prepared by the
International Com.~!littee of the Red Cmss, states: "The object of this subpamgraph is to encourage gestures of reconciliation which can contribute to
reestablishing normal relations in the life of a nation which has been divided. "53
The Geneva Conventions, then, would require prosecution of Saddam
Hussein for acts co:t1L'llitted during the international armed conflicts involving
llran, Kuwait, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. They vvould not, however,
c·equire prosecution of Charles Taylor, who is accused only of complicity in wmcrimes dming the: internal armed conflict in Sien·a Leone.

2. The Genocide Convention
Most of the countries of the world are pm1y to the Genocide Convenl!:icm,
\vhich eutered into force on January 12, 1952,, and the Xntemational Court of
j;ustice has determined that the substantive provisions of the Convention
constitute customary international law binding on aU states. 54 Like the Geneva
Con\7enticns, the Genocide Convention provides an abso!ute obligation to
55
prosen;te persons responsible fer genocide as defined in the. Conventimi.
The Genocide Convention defines genocide as one of the foHovving acts
'"'hsn ceor_ni.-rJHec! "with intent to destroy, in whole or in plli--t, a national,
ethnicaL racial or religious group, as such:"

k.anian Peoples Org. v. President ofS. Afr. 1996 (4J SA 67 l (CC) ')[ 30 (S. Afr.).
C'LAUDE flLLOUD ET AL.) COivEvfENTARY ON THE fWDITIOi,J.CJ. PROTOCOLS OF g .YUNE
1977 TG THE GENEVA COI,IVENT!Ol'IS OF 12 AUGUST 1949., at 1402 (1987).
5LJ.. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish;nent of the Crime of
r.Jt:-.nr_y_:id~. A.dvi2ory ()pini:JD, 1951 !.C.l 15, 23 (lVl&y 22) (stating that the CoDventic,r,'s
principks are binding on states, "even without any conventional obligation").
55. Article IV of the Genocide Convention states: "Persons committing genocide or aay
of the acts enumerated in ::rrtic!e HI shall be punished, whether they are consiitutionally
;-esponsible rulers, public officials or private individuals." Genocide Convention, supra note 45,
art. IV. Article V of the Genocide Convention requires states to "provide effective penalties"
for persons guilty of genocide. ld. art. V. Article V1 of the Genocide Convention requires
prosecution by the st::ne jn V:'hose territory genocide occurs oi· in an iniernai·ional court
established for this purpose. ld. art. VI. While ,A__rtic!e VI suggests that only the territorial state
and srale parties to an iilternational criminal court have an obligation to prosecute rhe crime of
genocide, other states would still be bound to extradite an individual accused of genoi.:ide ifthey
are not able to prosecute. Therefore amnesty or exile/sanctuary for pr::ace de8.ls wo•_d_d bF.
manifestly inconsistent with the obligations of the Genocide Cm1Vention.
52.

J..:;.
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(a) IGlling members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or menta! harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions oflife calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 56

There are several important limitations inherent in this definition. Frrst, to
constitute genocide, there must be proof that abuses were committed with the
specific intent required by the Genocide Convention. It is not enough that
abuses were intended to repress opposition; the intent must be literally to
destroy a group of people. Second, and even more importantiy, the victims of
such abuses must constitute a group of one of the four specific types
enumerated in the Genocide Convention, naJ."lrJ.ely, national, ethnic, racial, or
religious. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the drafters of the Genocide
Convention deliberately excluded acts directed against "political groups" from
the Convention··s definition of genocide. 57
The Genoc]de Convention would require prosecution of Saddam Hussein,
who has been accused of ordering attacks aimed at destroying the I'-Jorthem
tragi Kurds and the Southern Iraqi Marsh .A.xabs as a people, resulting in
hundreds of ltbous&JJ.ds of casualties. Charles 'faylor, in contrast, has not been
accllllsed of acts of genocide.

3. The Torture Convention

The Tonture tCo,-,ven"Liorn entered! into force on .June 2:6, 1927, and cmTently

'}a
lh~-;as 1
_.Jo
pal!_..nes. ss T'i ue

r-O~{Venuon
_ ,., .ae.nn.es
, .-: ·
"·'lLOrture
, " as..

56. Genocide Convention, supra note 45, art. li; Rome Statute for the Internationai
Criminal Court art. 6, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at
l! tq] ://www. un. org!Ia w/icc/statute/engiish/rome_statute( e). pdf.
57. The exclusion of "political groups" was due in large part to the fact that the
Convention was negotiated during the Cold \i\far, during which the Soviet Union and other
totalitarian governments feared that they would face interference in their inie.rna! affairs if
genocide were defined to include acts comJ!litted to destroy political groups. According to
Professor Kuper, "one may fairly say that the deiegares, after all, represented govemments in
power, and that many of these governments wished to retain an unrestricted freedom to suppress
political opposition." L. KUPER, GENOCIDE 30 (1982).
58.

Office of the United Nations High Com..11issioner for Human JP.Jghts, Status of the
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any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrilT'inztion of any kind, when such pain m suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 59

The Torture Convention requires each state party to ensure that all acts of
torture ::tre offenses undler its intemali law60 and! to establish its jurisdiction over
such offenses in cases where the accused is found in its i:eu!tory, 61 ai1d if such a
state does not extradite the alleged offender, the Convention requires it to
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. 62
Persons convicted of torture are to be subjected to harsh sentences
proportionate to the grave nature of the offense. 63
The Special Court for Sierra Leone charged Charles Taylor with
comrnitting c1imes against humanity in Sierra Leone, including compliciiy in
widespread and systematic acts of torture, from 1991-1999. 64 Notably,
however, neither Sierra Leone (the state where the acts of torture occurred),
Liberia (the state of nationality of the accused), nor Nigeria (the state vvhere
Charles Taylor was given asylum) were parties to the Torture Convention when
65
'i:he acts of torture in Sien·a Leone were cormnitted. And although the United
Ratification of the Convention Against Torture, http://www.ohchr.org/english!law/cat-ratify.htm
(lasi visited Nov. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Torture Convention Ratification Status].
59. Torture Convention, supra note 46, art. !.
60. Id. art. .!(.. Article L!. also requires parties to crimina!ize acts which "constitute[]
complicity or participation in torture." !d.

61.
62.

Id. art. 5.
ld. art. 7.

63. According to the negotiating record of the Torture Convention, "[i]n applying ai'i:icle 4
[which requires states to make torture "punishable by appropriate penalties which take into
ascot1!1t their grav~ nature~" Torture Con~.rentior., supra note t!.6, a.rt. l!.J, it seem~ re:nsonable tc
require ... that the punishment for torture should be close to the penalties applied to the most
serious offenses under the domestic legal system." J.lBURGERS & H. DANEL!US, T!-tE UNITED
NATIONS CONVEI'IT!ON AGA_lNST TORTURE 129 (1988).

6L!. Prosecutor v. Cha.rles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-0l-K, Indictment,']['][ 2.931 (Mar. 7, 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSC-03-0l-I-OOl.pdf.
65. The acts of tOrture alleged in the Special Court for Sierra Leone's indictment of
Charles Taylor occurred from 1991 to 1999. Sierra Leone ratified the Torture Convention on
Apr. 25, 2001; Nigeria ratified the Convention on July 28, 2001; Liberia ratified the Convention
on Sept. 22, 2004; and the United States ratified the Convention on Oct. 2i, 1994-. See Torture
Convention Ratification Status, supra note 58 (listing ratifying states).
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States, \Vhich helped broker the exile-for-peace deal, was a party to the Tonure
Convention during that time, the requirements of the convention are nm
applicable to <he United States in this case because the acts of torl:ure did not
occur in U.S. cen-itory, the offender was not a national of the United States, and
the offender was not present in U.S. territory. 66 Under the Vienna Co!tVeGciGE
on the Law of Treaties, the provisions of a treaty "do not bind a party in relation
to any act or fact which took place ... before the date of the entry into force of
the treaty with respect to that-party." 67 Consistent with the Vienna Convention
as well as the reasoning of the British High Court in tt"le Pinochet case, the
obligations to prosecute and to refrain from taking actions which would
frustrate prosecution contained in the Torture Convention "0.rere not apphcab!e.
to the case of Charles Taylor because his alleged involvement in acts of torture
68
pre-dated the ratification of the Convention by the relevant states.
Still, some wight argue that the Torture Convention is relevant to the
situation involving Charles Taylor based on the ComrrJ.ttee Agaimt Torture's
1990 decision concerning the Argentinean amnesty laws. In that case, thf.;
Committee Against Tortme, which is the treaty body created by the Torture
Csnv-entim1 to facilitate its implementation, decided th0.t con1Inunications
subrriltt.ed by Argentinean citizens on behalf of their relatives who had been
::mtured by Argentinean rnilitary amthorities were inadmissible since ;\rgentinD.
6
had ratified i:he Convention only after the mm1esty laws had been enac!ed. ''
However, in dictum, the Committee stated "even before the entry into force of
the Convention against Torture, there existed a general mle of internationa1lavi
which should oblige aU states to take effective measures to prevent tortEre and
70
tc punish ac!:s of torture."
The Cow. nutte:e's statement should not be mistakenly construed as
suggest~ng that amnesties/asylum for persons vvho commit tori:lJre is
66. See Torture Convention, supra note L!.6, art. 5 (sstting forth conditions U!!dt::.;: \;\,~t!dt ~
rrmst take action in response to Convention violations).
67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 28, i\llay 23, !1969, I 12. Stat. 2631-822,
11:55 U.N.T.2. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; c.f Rome Statute, supra note 56, c.rt. 2L!
(recognizing that the ~nternatiofiai Criminal Couri has no i·e-;xouctive ju!"isdictio~1 r~rrd :1:~~:
Si~f·.i.f:

obligations under the Rome Statute do not apply to crimes committed prior lo the ICC's entry
into force in July 2002).
68. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary lVIagistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.
3), [2000] l A.C. 147, 148-49 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.) (hoiding that head of state immunity
prevented prosecution or extradition of former Chilean President. Augusto Pinochet :for acts that
predated the ratification of the Torture Convention by Chile, Spain, and the United K.ingdom).
69. U.N. Committee Against Torture, Decision on Admissibili1y anne;, V!, ac 109-13,
U.N. Doc. AJ45i44 (June 21, 1990).
70. UJ·l. Can1J11ittee .Against Tortuit:.~ _Decision on .A.dn!issibiiity 3nnex ""VX~ 8t 109-13.
U.N. Doc. J\145/44 (June 21, 1990).
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under customary intemationallavv. By using the word "should, n the Comnlittee
indicated that its statement was aspirational rather than a declaration of binding
law. On the basis of its decision, the Committee urged Argentina to provide
remedies for the victims of torture and their surviving relatives; it did not
71
suggest that international law required that Argentina do so.
Nor did it
specify that the remedy should be prosecution of those responsible, rather L'1an
some other appropriate remedy such as compensation. The Conu·njttee's
decision, therefore, should not be read as indicating that the Torture
Convention required Nigeria, Liberia, or Siena Leone to prosecute those whose
acts of tmtwre pre-dated their ratification of the Convention.

4. General Human Rights Conventions
General human rights conventions include the International Covenant on
___,. ·~
1" .
• D. .
' snn.J
. "l ar!y
' word1eaJ E-~uropem!Lonven;;tw;rr
,.,
. wr
,.
Uvu
and!'n
rOI:<hca!
Jfi...Jghts, 7?-an d the
73
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, a..1d American
74
Convention on Human Rights.
Although these treaties do not expressly
requixe sta~es to prosecute violators, they do obligate states to "ensure" the
1ights enumerated therein. There is growing recognition in the jurisprudence of
the tre2.t:y bodies responsibfe for mm1itor]ng eJ'!!forcemen1t of tlhese conven~ions
andl the writings of respected cmmnentators that the duty to ensure nights
implies a ch.rty to hold specific violators accoumtable. 75

7L !d. at 1 11.
72. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signatl!re Dec. i 6,
1966, 6 LL.i\lli. 368, 999 U.N.'f.S. 171. The International Covenant cmrently ba,; l:'A parties,

inchH.iing both t.iberiB. m1d J'Jigeria. 1)ffice of the United 1'-Tations High (~ow_rnissioner for
liu.tTian Rights, R'at~ficarions a;td Resen;ajfons: Intcr;z~..'!tionai Covzncnt on Civil Gnd p·:.,·/iric::r.!
Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratificationN.htm (last visited Dec. I 6, ::W05).
"/3. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
74. .(Jrganlzation of A1Tterican States, it..tHci·ica!i Con-"'cn~ion ,:,Jj I-Ium&i"l P.Jghts, ..~.ic~t::d
Nov. 22, 1969, O.AS. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
75. See Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and l..iber(v, iii THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 114, 119 (Louis Henkin eel., ! 981) (arguing that parties to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arguably must e;leTcise due diligence !0
prevent intentional depriva!ion oflife by individuals, "as we!! as to apprehend murderers and to
prosecute them in order to deter future takings of life"); Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 2568
(arguing that states have a duty to bring torturers to justice); Thomas JBuergenthal, To Respect
nnd To Ensure: State Obligations and Pennissible Derogations, in T!-lEINTERNAT!Ot<ALBILLOF
RIGHTS 72, 77 {Louis Henkin ed., 1981) ("[The] obligation to 'ensure' rigbts creates affirmative
obJigations on Lhe state-for e~~ample, to discipline its offic!a1s. 11 ) .
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Yet, a careful examination of the jurisprudence of these bodies suggests
thai: methods of obtaining specific accountability other than criminal
76
prosecutions would meet the requirement of "ensuring rights. "
This
jurisprudence indicates that a state must fulfill five obligations in confronting
gross violations of human rights committed by a previous regime:
0) investigate the identity, fate, and whereabouts of victims; (2) investigate
the identity of major perpetrators; (3) provide reparation or compensation to
victims; (4) take affirmative steps to ensure that human rights abuse does not
recur; and (5) punish those guilty of human rights abuse. Punishment can
take many noncriminal forms, including imposition of fines, removal from
office, reduction of rank, forfeiture of government or mJlitary pensions, and
exHe.

B. Crimes Against Humanity

1. Definition
As developed in the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg Tribunal and
codified in the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
77
78
Yugos]avlia, the baemational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special

76.

See Schan.", supra note l 0, at 49-51 (criticizing conclusion that decisions of the InterCourt and Comrnission establish criminal prosecution as the only pei'Illissible remedy
for violations of the American Convention); Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No.4, Judgment ~I'll 164, 194 (July 29, 1988) (reaching disposition of case without
ordering crimina! prosecution); Hermosilla v. Chile, Case 10.843, Anter-A1n. C.H.R., Report.
No. 36/96, OEJVSer.UV/H.95, doc. 7 rev. 'Jl'll 57, 63, 66,77 (1996) (finding that Chile's grant of
amnesty and failure to investigate related disappearances violated /unerican Convention because
they foreciosed victims' fawJlies' rights to pursue their own criminai and civil remedies);
Orayece v. Chile, Case 11.505 et al., !nter-/Lm. C.H.R, Report No. 25/98, OEJ1Jser.UV/H.98,
doc. 6 rev. U 60-71 (1998) (making similar findings regarding Chile's violation of duty to
inves~igate and to provide victims and families with judicial remedies); Espinoza v. Chile, Case
H.725, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 133/99, OEJlJSer.UV/TI.l06, doc. 3 rev.
79-107
(2000) (making similar findings). For a summary of several relevant decisions of inlernational
and regional human rights bodies, see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on
i?'reve!iition of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Study Conceming the Right to Resti/laion,
Cornpensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 'll'll 50-92, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUl3.2/1993/8 (July 2, 1993) (submitted
by Theo van Boyen), reprinted in 59 LAW & CONTEiviP. PROBS. 284, 303-24 (1996).
77. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Sec!!rity Council Reso!l!tion 808, annex, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2570"~
(May 3, 1993).
78. S.C. Res. 955, annex art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
/~-rnerican

n
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Court for Sierra Leone, and tlhe Rome Statute for the Kntema~ional
Crimina} Court, 80 crimes against humanity are defined as:
79

any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;

(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;

(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental mks of intemationallaw;
(f) Torture;

(g) Rape, sexual slave1y, enforced prostill.ltion, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity;
(h) Persecutions against any identifiable group or coHectivii:y on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other
gmunds that are universally recognized! as impermissible 1.1nder
international law, in connection vvith any act refened to in this
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;

(i} Enforced d!isappeairance of p<::Irsons;

(j) 'fhe crime of dpartheid!;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionallly causing
great suffering, or serious i.njmy to body or to mental or physical
heahh. 2 !

States are required Io proseclJite g-rave breaches of the Geneva Conven~ions
and! the crime of gel!11ocide, !Jut there exists li]]O treaty requiring pmsec:t.!tiont of
79. Statute of the Special Court for Siena Leone, art. 2, http://www.sc-sl.org/scslstatute.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
80. Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 7.
8L E.g., id.
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crimes against humanity (except for torture where the state is pmty to the
Torture Convention at the time the crime is committed); crimes against
82
humanity are purely a creature of customary international1aw. Traditionolly,
those who corrmritted crimes against humanity were treated like pirates, as
hostis humani generis (an enemy of all humankind), and any state, including
83
their own, could punish them through its domestic courts. In the absence of a
treaty containing the aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) principle,
this so called "universal jurisdiction" is generally thought to be permissive, not
mandatory. Yet several commentators and human rights groups have recently
taken the position that customary international law (and the notion of jus
cogens-meaning peremptory norms) not only establishes permissive:
jurisdiction over perpetrators of crimes against humanity, but also requires their
prosecution and conversely prohibits the granting of at1111esty or asylum to such
perSOt1S~

84

2. C:ustonzary lntern.ational Latv
1

J;,Jotwithstanding the chimerical conclusions of some scholars, there is
scant evidence that a rule prohibiting amnesty or asylum in cases of crimes
against !nt!manity has ripe!iied into ~ comp<.dsory nonT.! of custonKay
intemmiona! law. CIUistomary in~ernationa1law, 'Which is just as binding upon
t'tates <IS treaty hn:v, arises fmm "a general and consistent practice of states
35
foHmJVed by them frmn a sense of Xegal obligation" referred to as opinio }iwis.

Urrncier

~raditiona1 notions of Cl.ilstomary intemational law, "deeds were vvhat
-' not JUSt
·
I
J..
1.
•
·
.•
1
WOK d S. nS6 y_ et [ll10Se
Wll!O
Bul"gl.ile tl13t
Cl.lS10fEKifY 1memarWl12l1

<Xl·FJH~e 1'-'!.,

82. The Charter of the Nuremberg War Crim~s Tribunal '.vas the first international
instrument in which crimes against humanity were codified. See Charter of the fnteroational
1\i.!ilitary Tribuna! annexed to the Agreement for ihe Prosecution and Punishment of iV1Fjor ·war
Criminals ofthe European A..xis, Aug. 8, 1945,59 Stat. I54A, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, as arilended by
Br:=:r~Rn P~otoco! cf tDct 6, I 945, reproduced in \VIRGINIA l\~10RRIS 8L IVi!CHAEL P. ScHARF~ 2 'I'HE
lNTERHATlOi~AL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
o-1.

473-80 (!998).
J'.JaonU R.obt-AlTiaza, Sources in lntern.alional Trel.Jties of an fJbiigation to

lm:esri gate, Prosec!!le and Provide Redress, inl"MPUNITY AND HUI\t!Ai'l P.JGHTS Il'! li\YfERNAT!Ol'!Al.
LA Vi AI·.JD PRACT!CE 25 (N. Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995).
[SL!..
See sup;~a. note 8 (coHecting sources).

85. EESTATEMENT ('fi-ll:RD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UN!TE.D STATES
§ !02(2) ( 1937); see also Statute of the ~ntemational Court of Justice art. 38(1 ){b), June 26,
L945, 59 Stat. l03l, l 051, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments.htm
(providing that sources of international law applied by the court include "intematio!.Jal custom,
a.s evidence of a general practice accepted as law").
86. Bnmo Simma, lntemationai Human Rights and Genero.l lmernational Lmv: A
~Cainpai~ative !'!i1alysis, in4 CBook 2) COLLECTED!COURSES OFTff..EA.cPnEivlY oFEUROPEANLAVJ

;_~J.~··O·J11
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law urec1udes am.Ilestv/exiJe for crimes against humanity base their position on
non;momg Generat Assembly resolt.Jtions, 87 hort~tive decla~ations of
.
.
c
88
' .
.
.
. 1 22iterTis.t;cnal. comerences, ana mtematwna! conventiOns that are not Vv1Ge1y
89
rTti:fied, rather than on any extensive state practice consistent with such a m1e.

153. 216 (1995).
87. See, e.g., Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), 8rt. 4 U.N.
Cr-\OR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. AJ6716 (Dec. l, 1967) (stating that the righc io
asyium n;ay not be i1woked for crimes contrary to the purposes and plinciples of the 'United
N::ttion.':l; Question of the Punishment ofi..:Var Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes Against Eumanity, G.A. Res. 2712 (XXV), 'J[ 3, U.N. GAO'R, 25th Sess., Supp. Nc·. 28,
U..N. DPr.:. AJ8028 (Dec. 15, 1970) (adopted 55-4 with thirty-three abstentions) (condenming
crimes against humanity and calling "upon the States concerned to bring to trial persons guilty
c.-i ccK:b crimes"); Question of ihe Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons VVho Have
Commilled Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI), 'J[ 4, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess.,
3upp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (Dec. 18, 1971) (adopted 71-0 with forty-l'.i;o abstentions)
(affirming that a swte's refusal "to cooperate in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment" of
persom accused or convicred of crimes against humani!y is "contrary to the United Natiow:
Charter and to generally recognized norms of international law"); Principles of Inter:natio;ial
C'ooperai.ion in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of ·wrJ.r
('.:if:1!;'S flEd C;irnes PLgrrinst Humanity. G.A. P..es. 3074 cr;JCV1H), ~[ 1) UJ·T. (}A:.')~_, 28th D--:.:::5 ..
Supp. l'-ic•. 30, iJ.i'L Doc. PJ9030 (Dec. 3, 1973) (adopted 94-0 with twenty-nine abstentions)
11
(l~rovic~ing that Ct!IT1es against hun1anity Shall be SUbject !-O investigation L1nd the pi:X0GfiS
against whom there is evidence that they have committed such crimes shall be subject to tracing,
11Test~ tr.ials and . if found guilty~ to punishment"); :Declaration on the Prote.ction ~.\f /Ul P::r~:~n~
from Enforced Disappearances, G.A. Res. 47/133 pmbl., art. 14, U.N. Doc. ~V47/49, at 207,209
(Pee. 18, 199'2) (equating disappearances to a crime against humanity and fi:':C)l'i.ring st"te~: i.:) ''Y
nny person ~uspected of having perpetrated an net of enforced disappe<trance); sec- a!sc
?rLnc!ples on th::: E[fe.ctive Pre..,'ention and Invc:;sligation ofExtr.a-legal~ A..rt~itrary and
E:\ecln:ion::;" B.::.. (~'. :Re~.. 1939/65 ann~x 1[ 18, tTJ·T. D1oc. E/l939/g9: r:J 53
·~:.::-. I9~~0)
(r:::0c•~vJn::_~ that statr:s shaH bring to justice those accused of having particjpated in exira-legaL
. ·=·r Sl~f(1..!fiE:(;/ t;(ecutioJns). it is note\vorthy thai: large nur.o1b;:r.s of c·.:~t~rhr.ies :1t~~r2.jnr~r~
d1Eing /0t;;:1g on the above listed resolni:ionst and thcr::b~/ did n1et nzanifest ~hei.c ;:-~ccer~tanc(~. .-~f
rb: prirv:ip]e.s en•JD!.eraied th~::rein.
1

[:.g. .-The final :Ded;.H'[itioP f1.Dd Programme of ./-\_ction of tbe ] 9S<:; '?lv~Lld c·vnfei•:::nct 0i!1
B\!ITl2rl Rights Bil:'inns that (S]tates should abrogate. legislation leading to jnrponity ro~· those
ieS!-JOfJ~ible for grave vioiations of human rights such as torture and prosecute such violation;,.,
thereby providing a tinn basis for the rule oflavv." V;lor]d Conference on }-lurnar! Righ~sl ]:1ne
]..:J-?5~ 1993, llienna J)ecln:Y!tion and Progtnintne o.f Action~[ 60, ·u.l\T. Dec. J:.)Conf.l57 /23
\June 25. 1993).
11

?.9. See, e.g .. {~onvention on the I"1on-_A.pplicabi]ity of Statutory Lirnitadons \o ~:?/a;
._-~·r;~nes ~:jn·~l ('·d~nr:~ P:.gRl!1St I-iur:1anity, art. 1 (1;)~ done l'lov. 26, 1962, 754 U.1'.1.T.~;. 7~~ {tn!.t(•:d
irmJ force l'·fo·.'. ll. 1970) (providing that no statutory iimitation shail apply tc crirrY:s ~!gains!
hurnanity, inespective of the date of !heir commission). Only thirty-nine state;; hm'e r;njfied tilt
·C:cmv~-::ntion . .E>.Je!"r if the Convention vvere n1ore vvideJy ratified, the r:rrohibitjon on E[::plying :.}
~\t:::rute: oflirnJtaticns to crirnes against 11Lunanity is not: the equivnlent cJ'". B dut.~: tr~ r-r0E>:r:-1~:-~ ::,."1·~:~

·--:riit!C~.

362

r·

63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339 (2006)

Commentators often cite the 1967 U.N. Declaration on Territorial
Asy1um 90 as Lhe earliest international recognition of a legal obligation to
prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity. The Declaration provides
;:tal: "the right to seek and enjoy asylum may not be invoked by <my person with
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he ha~ CO!TIIrlittec!
a ... crime against humanity. "91 Yet according to the historic record of this
resolution, "[t]he majority of members stressed that the draft declaration under
consideration was not intended to propound legal norms or to change existing
rules of international law, but to lay down broad humanitarian and moral
principles upon which States might rely in seeldng to unify their practices
- .·
1
u92
.
h ~,
relmmg
to asy_um.
Tl11s
evidences that, from the outset, Le
uerreralAssembly resolutions concerning the prosecution of crimes against humanity
''Vere aspirational only, and not intended to create any binding duties.
In addition to this contrary legislative history, the trouble with an approach
to proving the existence of customary international law that focuses so heavily
on words is "iliat it is grown like a flower in a hot-house and ithatt it is anything
but sure that such creatures wiil survive in the much rougher climate of actua1
'
" 93
- d d
. m
. t h.11s area 1s
.
state practrce.
ln
ee , to t h e extent any state practice
widespread, it is the practice of granting ami1esties or asylum to those who
cmn.rnit crimes against hmnanity. 94 That the United l\Tations itself has feh free
of legal constraints in endorsing recent aill.J.J.esty and exile-for-peace deals in
situations involving crimes against humar1ity suggests that custornary
international lavv has not yet crystallized in this area. The Special Court for
Sierra Leone confinned this when it recently held that domestic amnesties for
crimes against humanity and war crimes comrrnitted in an internal armed
95
conflict were not uJm]awfu! under intemat.ional !aw.

90. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2.312 (XX]]), art. i (21, U.N. G,Lt_OR,
Sess. 24, Supp. Ho. !6, U.N. Doc. PJ6716 (Dec. 14, 1967).
91. ld. at 8!. Even if the Declaration were binding, the prohibition on granting asylum is
not the equivalent of a duty to prosecute, and informal sanctuary can be acccrded ·Nithout n

fonnnl grant of asylum.
92. Declaration of Territorial Asylum, 1967 U.N.Y.B. 758,759, U.N. Sale~ No. E.63.I. l.
93. Simma, supra note 36, at 217.
94. See Scharf, supra note 10, at 57-58 (citing numerous examples).
95. Prosecutor v. Ka!lon & Kambara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(lE), SC3L-2004l6-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to JBrisdiction: Lome Accord A_mnesty ']17 (h1ar. 13,
20011,), al'ailable at http:!/w·,vw.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-04-15-PT-060-l.pdf & http://www.
sc-sl.org/SCSL-04-15-PT-060-H.pdf (holding that there was no "general obligation for States to
refrain from anmesty lavvs on these crimes .... [and that] [c]onseguently, if a State passes any
such law, it does not breach a customary mle" (quoting ANTONJO CASSESE, INTERNATlONAL
CRJMU~ALLAW 315 (2003))).
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Comm.entators may point to the Secretary General's August 2004 Report
to the Secmity Council on the Rule of Law and Transitional Jusiice as an
indication that the United l"Tations has recently altered its position on i:he
acceptability of amnesty/exile for peace deals. In that report, t.l:!e SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations said that peace agreements fu!d Security Council
resolutions and mandates should "[r]eject any endorsement of amnesty for
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, including those relating to
ethnic, gender and sexually based international crimes, [and] ensure that no
such amnesty previously granted is a bar to prosecution before any United
96
Nations-created or -assisted court. " His more signific:mt, however, that in the
Security Council's debate on the Secretary-General's Report, there vvas no
consensus on this particularly controversial recommendation (only two of the
fifteen members of t.he Council-Brazil and Costa Rica-spoke in favor of it
'Nhile several opposed it), and the statement approved by the Council at the end
-~f the debate made no reference to the issue of am_j_nesty. 97

3. Jus Cogens
The concept of jus cogens-meaning "peremptory norms"-is said to be
among the "r11ost ambiguous and ilheoreticaHy problematic of the doctrines of
international law. "98 Since the inception of the modem state system three and a
half centuries ago, 99 international law has been based on notions of consent
Under this concept of jus dispositivium (positive law), states vvere bound on~y
to treaties to which they had acceded and to those rules of customary
international law to which they had acquiesced. The concept ofjus co gens, in
96. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and
:--ransiriona! Juslice in Coidlicl and p·osl-~Conjhci Socieiizs ~[ .S.:!.\ ~0 .1'-1. l)oc. ~./2004/61 f., (f\.ug.
23~. 2004). See also U.l\l. SCOR, 59th SesG., 5052nd n1tg. at 5, tLl··,f. Doc. 8/P.i/.5051: (()ct. 6~
2004), for the Secretary-General's remarks to the Security Council.
97. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5052nd mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5052 (Oct. 6, 2004);
U.I'L SCOR, 59th Sess., 5052nd mtg., Resumption 1 at 26, 37-38, U.N. Doc. SI'?'V.5052
(Resumption 1) (Oct. 6, 2.004).
98. Christopher A Ford, Adjudicoting Jus Cogens, J3 VVJS. Itrr'LL.J. 145, 145 (1994);
see also JIJJthony D' Amato, D's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Co gens, 6 CoNN. J. lNT'LL. l, 1-2
( 1990) (discussing the broad array of norms lumped under the heading jus co gens).
99. The state system, characterized as an association of sovereign states governed by
positive law rules to ··.vhich they must consent before they are bound, is widely believed to have
originated with the Peace of\7ifestphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648. Stephane
Beaulac, The Westphalian Legal OrrhodmJ'-Myth or Reality?, 2 J. HlST. INT'L L. 148, 148
(2000). For the fuli text of the Peace of Westphalia (Osnabruck and IvJunster) Treaties, in both
their Latin and English versions, see 1 CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 119,270 (Clive PaEy ed.,
1969).
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c:G:-:.-.trast, !0 bEsed in part on natural lavv principles that 11 IJIC1lail D\ler an.d
invalidate international agreements and other rules of international lav/ in
11100
c:~;:nflict \7/ith thexn.
Though the term itself was not employed, the jus co gens concept was first
applied by the U.S. Militfury Tribunal at Nuremberg, which declared that the
treaty between Germany and Vichy France approving the use of French
prisc~aer~s c~f \:v·ar in the Gennan aa-mar-nents industry \Vas void under
.
.
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- ) ]Qi
mternat10na1 la'-'V as contra bonus mores contrary to rundamentcu morals". The debates vvithin the U.N. L'lternational Law Com.nrission, ·vvhich codified rhe
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retlect the ·;ievv that the phenomenon of Nazi Germ.any rendered the pur:;1y
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ccmtractua_1 conceptwn or mternatwna_1 1.aw msUIHCient ~-10r Lie
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Cousequcndy, tbe International Law Commission opined that a treaty designed
tJ nronwte slavery or genocide, or to prepare for aggression, ought to be
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'Thus~ ptB·~uant to the jus cogens concept~ s!ates are protrftited fror.~!..
co1mTlitting crimes against humanity and an international agreement bei'Neer:.
states to facilitate commission of such crimes would be void ab initio.
Moreover, there is growing recognition that universal jurisdiction exists such
that all states have a right to prosecute or entertain civil suits against the
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100. RESTATElvlENT(THIRD)OFTHEFORE!GNRELAT!ONSLAWOFTHEUNITEDSTATES § 102
cmt. k (l%7).
JO]_ Unit-:;d States v. K..rupp, 9 TRIALS OF V'l AR CRiM!l,IALS BEFORE THE iJTERE1·1BE?.G
l•/.\ILJTARYTP.lBUJ·IAJ...SUNDERCO!'-lTROLCOUNCILLAWHO. 10, at 1395 (1950).
102. A.nicle 53 of the Vienna Convention provides:
A trt:.aly is vo~d if~ at the ti!ne of its conclusion~ it coDflicts vvith a pere·n1f>l.Ory Tlt.Hln

of general international lavv. For the purposes of the present Cvn\'ti!tiG1!, ti.
p~rr:rnp•:or~/ r:onn of general intenla!:iona1la\V is a norr.n accr::pted !1nd rr:c·ognizr::r.:! L:~.r
the international comn1unity of States as a V:.thole rr~ a no~m from 'Fbicb :1·:·
derogation is pern1itted and \:vhich can be !nodifitd only ty a subs~5quent i1G.rEJ 0f
gr,neral international law having the same c!Jamcter.
-fi.::nna Convention~ SL(pra note 67, at =~44.

1o::~.

P.e~narks

of P._ntonio de Luna (Spain) in Suinn:tor~~ Records of'th.e !5th Session, 6/J.::/dl
IDt'l L. Conun'n72, ~i 61, UJ..L D-oc.lJCl'L~i.J156 Cr. il.ddenda.

jtfc.?ting: [1g63] 1 ·l.B.

Jd.
Ivi.ichael !?. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Na!ionals of Non-Party S:ates: fi
·':n'tiqr!e ofthe US. Positio11, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 38-90 (2001) ("Iii::: IJOW V!idely
accepted that crimes against humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction."):. Dernjanjuk '!.
Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 58:2 (6th Cir. 1985) (observing that "[i]ntemntional law recognizr::r.
104.

105.

\;niversa] jurisdiction~ over certain offenses, u including crimes against hurnanit:/ a!!d g':"':rlG·:ide).
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states from undertaking any action that wmlld frustrate prosecution, such as
granting amnesty or asylum to those who have committed crimes against
h
-,·,., 106
•. umau,y.
Such scholars fail, however, to take into consideration the fact that
although jus co gens has natural law underpinnings, the concept is also related
to customary law. A rule will qualify as jus co gens only if it is "accepted by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted. " 107 Thus, jus co gens norms have been described by one
court as "a select a11d narrow subset of the nonns recognized as customary
108
intemationallaw. " As with ordina..ry customary internationallaw,jus co gens
norms are fom!ed th.rough widespread state practice and reCOgl'llition, w9 but
unlike ordinary customary international law, a state can no~ avoid application of
a jus co gens norm by being a persistent objector during its formation.
Though there is no question that the intematioilllaJ community has accepted
l:hat the prohibition against cowJill11jtting crimes against humanity qualifies as a
jus co gens norm, 1!O this does not mean that tlile associated duty ~o prosecute has
106. See supra note 8 (collecting sources).
107. Vienna Convention, supra note 67, at 344.
108. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F. 3d 1166, 1i 80 (D.C. Cir. I 994) (Wald,
J., dissenting) (citing Comm. of U.S. Citizens lLiving irr Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2cl929, 9L!O
(D.C. Cir. 1988)).
109. As Judge Patricia Wald noted in Princz:
To ascertain customary international law, judges resor£ 1o "1he customs and usages
of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to tbe works of jurists and
commentators." These same tools are used to determine whether a norm of
customary international law has attained the special status of a jus L·ogens norm.
!d. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
110. See Siderman de Blake v ..A.rgentina, 965 lF.2d 699, 7l5 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The
universal and fundamental rights of human beings identified by Nuremberg-rights against
genocide, enslavernent, and other inhunnane acts-are the dh:ecL ancestG~·s of the universal and.
funciamental norms recognized as jus cogens." (citation omitted!)); Den~janjuk, 776 P.1d at 5g2
(s<ating that ''[i)ntemational law recognizes 'universal jurisdiction' over certain offenses,"
including crimes against humanity a11d genocide); Hirsh v. llsrael, 962 iF. Supp. 377, 381
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd 133 F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1997) ("A foreign state violates jus co gens when it
participates in such blatant violations of fundaiJienial human rightc; z.s 'genoc~d~, d:t'J5t~.'~
murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and racial discrimination."' (quoting Com;n. of
U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 iF.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir. i988)); Barcelona.
Traction, lLight & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 LCJ. 3, 32 (Feb. 5) (clistinguishing
beiween rights of prolection that have entered into the body of general !ntemational iaw and
those th<:>.t are confe!Ted by international instruments); Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, l95 1 tCJ. 15, 23
(Ivlay 28) ("The principles underlying the Convention are recognised by civilised nations as
binding on States even without any conventional obligation."); Theodor Meron,
!ntematioHal C;-iminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. !i,JT'L L. 554, 558 (1995)
(liThe core prohibitions of crirnes against htnnanity f.rtd the crinl!e of genocide ccnstitntejl!S
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sirrmhaneousiy attained an equivalent status. h fact, all evidence is to the
contrary. I'-Joi' only have there been nurnerous instances of states providing
3J11nesty and asylum to leaders accused of crimes against humanity, but, even
=nore telling, there have been no protests from states when such am!'1esty or
asylum has been offered. Moreover, there has been widespread judicial
recognition that the jus co gens nature of crimes against humai'1ity does not
prevent accused perpetrators from successfully asserting head of state im!11Unity
or sovereign imrnunity to avoid criminal or civii liability in foreign courts. 111
Because jus co gens, as a peremptory norm, wou1d by definition supersede the
customary intemationa1law doctrine of head of state immunity where the two
come into conflict, the only vvay to reconcile these rulings is to conclude that
;che: diuty to prosecute has not attained jus co gens status.
As compared to the substantive rule oflavv prohibiting states from entering
into iE1term~tiona! agreements that facilitate the commission of crimes against
hmnanity, the procedma] obligation of ~hiro! p;::uiies to prosecute such crimec
after their CCTJ1iTJLission constitutes a far greater il!1trusion imo a state's internal
sovereignty, with far less justification. Thus, it is se11sible that such an
encroachment would require the state's consent through the carefully
negotiated provisions of a treaty-such as the Geneva Conventions, Genocide
Convention, or Torture Convention.-whicb wouid na!Towly define lhe
s.pp1]cab1e chrcunr1stances and perhaps-Iike !be JEc,~·ne S:t2.tute-p~·.u":.Jide escape
dauses permitting states to disregard the obligation ro prosecute >.vhen strict
,:;nforceruent would frustrate greater interests of international peace and justice.

'Jf'he at<:}Ve d]scussion RllldTicaKes
there (}LR·e freqpJJendy no ~nlternat~O~jc.I
~legal COIT1slraints on [he Kl!egotialt]on of 3lD .SJThT1es~y/e;~~](~-for-·peBI:~e de3L 2:rM5l tb.S:lt
CDgc:n:; TIO!TE1S."_).

Ill. Sa Wei v. Jiang, 383 F.3ci 620, 6'!.7 C/lh Cir. :!004·) (concluding that vioiation of jus
co gens is not ~m irnplied Vv'c.iver of head of state ir£~munity ); Sr!litb 'J. 2or::i2i1ist P·eopl.::~ s :__ib),D.!1
hab Jamahiriya, lOi F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. !996) (same); lPrincz v. Federal Republic of

~Germany~ 26 F.3d 1166~ I 173 (D.lC. Cir. 1994) (same); Sid.en11an de Blake v. i~gentina~ 965

F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1992) (determining whether sovereign immunily under U.S. law applies
to jus co gens violations); R~egina ·v. Bo\v 8l. 1\lietro. St]pendiary htlagistrate~ ex p(1ne J?inochet
Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A. C. 147 (H.L 1999) (U.K.) (allowing head of slate immunity defense
for crimes ccnnmitted prior to ratificatioi1 of Torture Convention); 1Case (:oncern!ng the Arrest
Vvarrant of l 1 April2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Bel g.), 2002 i.C.l21-22 (Feb. !4), available m
http://wwvv.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEfr::une.htm (denying exception to head of
state immunity for war crimes); A.l-Adsani v. United Kingdom, No. 35763/97, § 61, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2001) (r.!lTirwjng state immDnit}' from iEter~1?:ticnal civil suit::;).
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in certain circumstances swapping aJl!1.J.!esty/exile for peace can serve the
interests of both peace and justice. However, an international criminal tribunal.
is not bound to defer to a domestic amnesty/exile arrangement. 112 During the
negotiations for the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court
(ICC), the United States and a few other delegations expressed concern that the
ICC would hamper efforts to halt human rights violations and restore peace and
democracy in places like Haiti and South Africa. 113
According to the Chairman of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, Philippe
Kirsch. of Canada, the issue was not definitively resolved during the Diplomatic
Conference. Rather, the provisions that were adopted reflect "creative
a.mbiguity" that could potentially allow the prosecutor and judges of i!he KCC to
interpret the Rome Statute as permitting recognition of an amnesty or asyhllm
except10n to t h e JUns d"1ctxon o_f t h_e court 114
0

0

0

°

1. The Preant.ble
The preamble to the Rome Statute suggests that deferring a prosecu~ion
because of the existence of a national aiTJJ.Iies!y or asylum deal woulid be
incompatible with the purpose of the court, namely to ensure criurninaJ
prosecution of persons vvho cominit serious international Climes. In partitc1.d8!ll",
the Preamble:

112. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) recently held that the Lome Accord,
which granted amnesty to the perpetrators of crimes committed during the conflict in Sierra
Leone, could not deprive the SCSL of jurisdiction because the SCSL was an international cour1
with jurisdiction over international crimes. Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kambara, Case Nos. SCSJL200~-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-fo.R72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lome
Accord Jl.mnesty ~I'll 87-89 (Mar. 13, 2004), avaiiable o.t http://www.sc-si.org/
Documents/SCSJL-04-15-P'f-060-l.pdf & http://www.sc-si.org/SCSJL-04-15-Pl"-060-U.pdf.
113. See U.S. Delegation Draft: State Practice Regarding Amnesties and Pardons 1 (Aug.
17, 1997), http://www.iccnow.org/romearchive/documentsreportsprepcmt4.htmi ('The U.S.
delegation h!!s raised the diffic:ult matter ofhov; to address amnesties and pardons in the context
of a statute for an international criminal court.").
! 14. l"he author discussed this issue with Philippe Kirsch over dinner during tm
international conference in Strasbourg, France, on November 19, 1998. Michael r. Scharf, The
flmnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the Intemationol Crimirwi Court, 32 COPJ,IELLKNT'L
LJ. 507, 522 n.104 (1999). U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Arman has stated that it would be
"inconceivable" for the ICC to undermine an amnesty-for-peace ai-rangement by pursuing
prosecution in a situation like South Africa. Kofi A.11nan, Secretary-General ofthe U.N., Speech
at the Witwatersrand University Graduation Ceremony (Sept. l, 1998), quoted in Darryi
Robinson, Sen,ing the Interests of justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the lidernational
Criminal Cm.m, 14 EuR. J. IJ.JT'LL. Ll,g2 n.5 (2003).
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Afiirm[s] that the most serious crimes of concern to the international
cmRmunity as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective
prosecution must be ensured ...
•

•

1

Recall[s] that it is the duty of every State to e;:erc1.se 1ts cnmmat
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes ...
[And] Emphasiz[ es] that the International Criminal Court established under
115
this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.

Preambular language is important because international law provides that
"[a) treaty shaH be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the ten:.11s of the treaty in their context and in i:he light of
116 Thus, the Rome Statute's preamble constitutes a
its object and purpose."
critical source of interpretation because it indicates both the treaty's context and
il!:s object and purpose. Yet, notwithstanding this preambular language, there
are seven;] articles of the Rome Statute (discussed below) that rnight be read as
pennitting the court under certain circumstances ·to Iecognize an amnesty
exception to its jurisdiction. The apparent conflict between these articles and
the preamble reflects the schizophrenic nature of the negotiations at Rome:
The preambular language and the procedural provisions were negotiated by
entirely different drafting groups, and in the msh of t~e dosing days of the
Ro:me Cof!..fe.rence, the drafting committee never fuHy integTated and reconciled
the separate portions of the Statute.

2. Article 16: Action by the Securiiy Council
V\T]tb respect to a poten~iai arrmesty/asy!um exception, the most import21i1t
provision of [he Rome Statute is Artide I 6. Under that artilde, the ICC vvouk!
b~ ret:;p}ired fc 1::> def~r to 2. nati.ona~ a.nmcsi.)i Jif the Setud~y Cm.mciJ adopts a
Tesolu~ion under Chapter VTI of the United N atilons Charter requesting fine cownt
no1t to COITJ.menKe 2LH inves~igation or prosecution, or ito defer ru'1Y proceedings
117
akeady in progress.
The Security Council recently invoked its r.i.ghlt urrH:iler
115. Rome Statute, :mp;-a note 56, pmbl.
I 16. Vienna Conveniion, supra note 67, at 340.
117. Article 16 of the Rome Statute, titled, "Deferral of investigation or prosecution,"
states:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this
Statute for a peri.od of 12 months a.frer the Security Council, in a resolution adopred
under Chapter VH of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to
that effect; that request rrt.i:\)' be renewed b:,' the Council under the same condirions.

FROM THE eXILE FILES

369

_A_rticle 16 of the Rome Statute in adopting Eesoh.Jtion 1593, referring the
Darfur atrocities to the ICC for prosecution but at the same time providing that
Lhe ICC could not exercise jurisdiction over foreign :military personnel in
Dat-fur who are from states (other than Sudan) that are not parties to the Rome
' ,, t ]]8
,S G:tcu e.
The Security Council has the legal authority to require the court to respect
an anmesty or asylum if two requirements are met, namely: (1) the Security
Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the
119
peace, or an act of aggression under Article 39 of the U.l'-J. Charter;
and
(2) the resolution requesting the ccn.1rt' s deferral ~s consistent vJiili the purposes
fu!d principles of the United Nations with respect to maintaining international
peace and security, resolving threatening situations i.n conformity wit.h
principles of justice and international law, and promoting respect for human
120
rights and fundamental freedoms under Article 2.4 of the U.N. Charter.
The decision of the Appeals Clumber of the ~:{ugoslavia Tribunal i:u the
Tadic case suggests that the ICC could assert that it lhas the authority to
independently assess vvhe~her these two requirements were met as prui of its
incidental power to detemilne the propriety of i.ts own jurisdiction (competence
de la competence). 121 One comn1entator has characterized thi.s aspect of ilhe
Appeals Cha.Jt-nber decision as "strongly support[ing) those who see the U.N.
Charter not as unblinl\:ered license for poi!ce action but as an emerging

constitution of c:nurnerated, !irrrited povvcrs subject to the. rule of lavv ." 122 lit is
possible, then, that the ICC would not necessarily be compelled by i!:he
exisience of a Security Council resolution to terminate an investigation or
prosecution were it i:o find that an amnesty contravenes ]ntemationallai-v.
"\J\lhile an amnesty or exile arrangemen! accompanied by the establishment
<.:,f a tmth •:;o:mrnission, victim ~~mnpensation, and lustr2ction mJght be i.n ~he
in!.erests of justice in !he broad sense, i~ \VouM nonetheless be in contravention
of in~emation.H! £a1v where ~~he grave breaches provisions f''f tl]e ] 949 Genev;;,
l!.::onve:ntjon.s, [he Genocide Convention, or the Tor~ure Cmwentlion aure
appficab]e. H is especially note\vmthy tha( the Geneva Conventions require
Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 16.
113. S.C. Res. 1593, 'J[6, lJ.I-J. Doc. S:llP.:.ES/ 1593 (Mar. 3l. 2005), avaiiable at
l!ttp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions05.htm.
119. U.N. Charter art. 39.
120. tJ.l,·!. ~Charter CJrL 24~ paras. f.-2.
121. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-l-AR72, Decision on ihe Defence Ivllotion for
Enterlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 'lf 6 (Oct. 2, ! 995).
122. Jose E. Alvarez, Nuremberg Revisited: The Ta.dic Case, 7 EUR. J. XNT'Lli~. 245, 2'!-9
(~996;.
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parties "to provide effective penal sanctions for persons com1nitting, or
ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
123
Cmwention,"
that the Genocide Convention requires pa_rties "to provide
effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide,-" 124 ~d that the Torture
Convention requires parties to make torture "punishable by appropriate
penalties which take into account their grave nature." 125
This would suggest that the ICC might not defer to the Security Council
under Article 16 of the Rome Statute where the accused is charged vvith grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the crime of genocide, or torture.
Yet, a strong counterargument can be made that the Rome Statute codifies only
the substantive provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Genocide
Convention, and the Torture Convention, and does not incorporate those
procedural aspects of the Conventions that require prosecution (which apply to
the state parties but not to the ICC, which has its own international legal
personality). Accordingly, ilie nature of the charges might constirur~e a factor to
be considered but vvould not necessarily be a bar to deferring to an amnesty or
exile a.rrangement

3. Article 53: Prosecutorial Discretion
Where the Security Council has not requested the ICC to respect lli"1
amnesty m exile-for-peace deal and thereby to tenninate a prosecution, the
court's prosecutor may choose to do so under Ar~ide 53 oftl1e Rome Statute. 126
That article pe1mits the prosecutor to decline to initiate an investigation (even
when a state party has filed a complaint) where the pmsecutor concbdes there
123.
124.
125.

Geneva Convention X, supra note 44, art. 49.
Genocide Convention, supra note 45, <:crt. V.
Torture Convention, st!pra note 46, art. 4.
126. A.sijicle 53 of the Rom.e Statute titled~ "Initiation of Hf! ~nvest1gation~ ~~ pro~~.ridles in
relevant part:
i. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated tbe infom1ation made available to him or
her, initiate an investigation unless he or she deter111ines that there is no reasonable
basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate ail investigation,
the Prosecutor shaH consider whether: ...
(c) Talcing into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims,
there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would
not serve the interests of justice.
H the !Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed and his or
her determination is based solely on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform
the Pre-Trial Chamber.
Rome Statute, supra ncte 56, e:rt. 53.

FROM THE eXILE FILES

371

are "substantial reasons. to believe that an investigation would not serve the
interests of justice." 127 However, the decision of the prosecutor under .AJtide
53 is subject to review by the pretrial chamber of the court. In reviewing
whether respecting an arru1esty or exile deal and not prosecuting would better
serve "the interests of justice," the pretrial chamber would have to evaluate the
benefits of a particular amnesty or exile arrangement and consider whether
there is an international legal obligation to prosecute the offense (as discussed
above).

4. Article 17: Complementarity

Where neither the Security Council nor the prosecutor has requested lthe
ICC to defer to a n.ational<t~unesty, the concerned state can attempt to raise the
issue under Article 17(l)(a) of the Rome Statute. That article requires the court
to disri1iss a case where ''[t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a
State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable
128
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. " It is significant that
the article requires an investigation but does not specify that it be a criminal
investigation. The concerned state could argue that a truth commission
(especially one modeled on that of South Africa) constitutes a genuine
investigation. On ti'le other hand!, subsection (2) of Artide ] 7 suggests that trhe
127. ld. DarTy! Robinson, who served on Canada's delegation to the ICC Preparatory
Committee from 1997-2002 and is currently a legal adviser to the ICC Prosecutor, has proposed
the following criteria for deterwining whether deferring to an aw_nesty or exile arrangemeDt
would be "in the interests of justice":
o
Was the measure adopted by democratic will?
o
Ks the departure from the standard of criwinal prosecurion of all offenders
based. on

necessity~

i.e. [sic] irresistible

social~ -::~.::D31on1ic

or po1itjc9J

renlities?
0
!s there a full and effective i111vestigation into the facts?
-o
Does the fact-finding inquiry 'name names'?
0
Js the relevant commission or body independent and suimbly resonrced?
o
Is there at least some form of punishment of perpetrators (are they
identified, required to come forward, required to do community service,
subject to lustration)?
o
Ks some form of remedy or compensation provided to victims?
o
Does the national approach provide or sense of closure or justice to
victims?
o
Is there a corn.mitment to comply with other human rights obligations?
Robinson, supra note J.JL!., at 4·97-98.
128. ld. art. 17(l)(a).
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sland~r~1 fc.; dete!.!.lrining that an invesLigaLion is noi genu!ne 1s V\lhe~~he:r {ht
proceedings are ilinconsistent V\'ith an intent to bring the pr::rson ~:oncerned t.o
:
.•
rr 1:::!.9
·,
~
• ~
'
•
J
•
·
•
jUSnce
-a phrase
t11at nmght oe mterpreteu as requmng cmrunai
proceedings.

***
In sum, the Rome Statute is purposely ambiguous on the guestwn 0f
·whether the iCC should defer to an arrLiiesty/exile-fm-peace am:;.ngemem in
deciding whether ta exercise its jurisdiction. Vvhile amnesties and exiles are
sometimes a necessar-y bargaining chip in negotiations for the peaceful transfer
of political power, it must be recognized that such ru-rangements can vary
greatly. Sorne? as in ScJuth Africa c.nd £-Ka!ti~ are c-losely ]jnked tc mech0_~iis~~-1~
fm providing accountability and redress; others, as in the case of the exile of
Charles Taylor, are simply a mindful forgetting. The ICC should take "'>nly thF:
former types of amnesties/exiles into accoum in prosecutorial decisions.
I,;loreover, the ICC should be particularly rductan! to defer 1to an amnest.y/Pxile
in situations, in.;/Gh.!iEg ·vio1at]ons of intenn.ational conventions that CfCS.'tt
otHgations to prosecute~ such as the 1·Jenocide Convention and the grrxve.
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions. The other intemctti()':c;l
agreements and customary intemationaJ. law crimes that make up the ICC" s
subjecf. matter jt~risdiction n10.ke prosecution f~·r rel.?:.ted crirnes possible~ b~Jit r.:Gr~
rr1cntdatory, ~ind should be ·~reated as such by the. court iD tbe broader .~lr.~etests of
peace an.cf ]uternf}~icnai security.
IV. Conclusion

tit1r: illit.:::rnadona1

procedl~Jt81

]a\v in1pGsir;.g .s.
.

.

..

-·

i!J-[\ 1~f:k £A8J:J!l)[~f:;:t
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·lJ t"J;-(-:,jp 2-~-S-

130

129. Id. an. 1~/C!)(b). ·Cantj}C!i~e Bruce E-Tocn1.he1l, Th2 (:r:!;-:zati:a.-zal Criitli.iltil Cou;·t: r_
-Checklisr fc;- l·!cnionti! Jrnpiernenro.tion! in ICC RATIM·CATTON AND l"·1ATlOJ-..iAL Kl1/1PLEl\iJEi~-!T!HG
LEGISLATION l4L!- (I\.1{ ~Chcrif Bassiouni ed., 1999) ( It is also conceivable that an ;unn·.::sty
granted in the context of u. 'trntb corr..rnissi0n.~ prot::css con1d bt considered an 'inve;;tlgatlcr/
follo·wed by a bona f!de decision not to procet:-d for the purposes of A.rticle 17( l)(b). quori?t.:l
in Robinson., supra note 1 E~!-:a( 499 n .78~ 1rith John I-Iohnes~ The Principle ofCornplenu!ntar-i~J· .
in THE lNTERNATJOJ·JAL Cfi.lMii'lAL COURT: THE MAKJNG OF THE ROME STADJTE 77 (R.S:. Lee erl.
1999) ("It is c1ear that the- 3taxute~ s provir.ions c.n somp~erneniarity are intt::nded ~o ~-c.fer ~.c.
cri1ninal investigat~ons .... A. t!"Pth comwi.:.sion and Lhe amnesties it provides may not r.neet lbs
test of a crin1i~1aJ. iilvestiga.!icu .... ~~)~quo red in Robinson. supra note 114-, a1499 n.b i.
130. Cf Ratner, st:pra note HJ, al 7·14 (characterizing the procedural requiren1ent to
prosecute as lla;,:count.ability non11slt .\·1nd the substantive lcrw P.:Stahlish1ng off~nse.-=: as tthsbiJ!t.~'
11
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reason for this is historical: 'Nith respect to all but the most notorious of
international crimes, it was easier for states to agree to recognize permissive
jurisdiction than to undertake a duty to prosecute. But where the duty to
prosecute does apply, it is critical tJ.l.at states and international organizations
honor it, lest they express contempt for the important treaties from which the
duty mises, potentially putting their O'VVD. citizens at risk pursuant to the
international law principle of reciprocity.
This is not to suggest, however, that states mus~ rush to prosecute an
persons involved in offenses under these treaties. Selective prosecution and use
of "exemplary trials" is acceptable as long as the criteria used ret1ect
appropriate distinctions based upon degrees of culpability and sufficiency of
evidence. 131 Moreover, while the provisiom; of the treaties requiring
prosecution are nonderogable even in time of public emergency that threater1s
~he life of the nation, the doctrine of force majeure can vva.'lrant temporm-y
postponement of prosecutions for a reasonable amount of time until a new
government i.s secme enough to take such action against members of the fonner
regime or until a new government has the judicial resources to undertake fair
. ff .
.
]1?
and e_ ectnre prosecutwns. ·In the case of Saddam Hussein, the United! Stai:es had accused the llraqi
leader of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of the
Genocide Cmwenhon. Both the United States and traq vvere parties to these
treaties, which contain an absolute obligation to prosecute offenders. By
offering to permit exile and perpetual sanctuary in Bahrain in lieu of invasion
and prosecution, the Bush adm.inistration signa~ed that the provisions of these
treaties are inconsequential, thereby undermining the rule of law i.n a critical
area of global affairs. This must be viewed also in !nghlt of othe:r U.S. actions
i'flJVOKving applicatiOTiit of \the Geneva c:onventions to the conflict in Kraq, fHOSt
notably \the infamous VIh.ite House n'iemos agthoTedi by nm~v Attomey Gener;;J
AJberftG Guii::aJes. The men111os refer to tlhe Geneva Conventions as "obso£eite"
and "qpJJain1t~" 133 and -sNfOfltg~y opiuae ·~hat itLEe 1'v£[Ufl:; t_=ODI.h=:ntion perrii.1.its ;rn]Jj
norms"); Mark A. Surrc\'ners, The International Court of Justice's Decision in Congo v.

Belgiurr1: J-lavv I-Ias li' Affzctcd the D:3v~lop:n.ent of C! Principle ('.f i)r!!V'3.i"&"!f Jurisdic1ion that
Would Obligate All States to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. Ii'-H'L L.J. 63, 95 (2003)
(characterizing the procedural requirement to prosecute ilS "obligatory universul jtEisdiction,"
and distinguishing it from "voluntary universal jurisdiction").
131. Michaei P. Scharf & Nigel Rod!ey, lntemcrtimwi Law Principles on Acco;mtabifh:\', iii
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 89,95 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 2002).

J 32.
133.

ld. at 96.

Memorandum from J\Jberto R. Gonzales, Counsei to the President, to President
George W. Bush, at 2 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://wwvv.lmmamightsfirst.org/u~_law/
etn/gov_rep/gov_memo_int!aw.htm. !.Il a dissenting memo, Secretary of State Colin Pm'iel!
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o'f torture, 134 there
am to ward. mtematwna_
humanitarian law and opening the door to the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq. lin a statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Admiral
Jiohn Hutson, Judge Advocate Genera] of the U.S. Navy from 1997-2000,
urged the Bush adrrlinistration to officially and unequivocally repudiate
Gonzales's erroneous position. ln doing so, Hutson stressed that:

Since World War Hand looking into the foreseeable future, United States
armed forces are more forward-deployed both in terms of numbers of
deployments and numbers of troops than all other nations combined. ·what
this means in practical terms is that adherence to the Geneva Conventions is
more important to us than to any other nation. We should be the nation
demanding adherence under any and all circumstances because we will
benefit the most. 135

········11

Because Hussein did not accept the exile-for-peace offer, the damage to
tl!.e mle of law in this instance was negligible. Would greater damage to the
rule of ]aw have neveri:heless been acceptabk: if it succeeded in averting a war
vvhich has resulted in tem of thm~sands of casualties on both sides since 2.003?
This Article has described the po]icy reasons generally favoring prosecution,
including the fact that former leaders who have resorted to war crimes and
crimes against humanity tend to be recidivists. Saddam Hussein himself
launched a coup and initiated his policy of terror after he was released from
prison i:hrough a domestic amnesty in li968. Xt is nor hard to imagine the
daumgers Hussein could present to the Kraqi democratic transition fmm exile in
Jlllearby Bahrain. Moreover, the people oftraq have insisted on Hussein's tria1
lJefore tihe tragi Special TritmnaL 136 1\.~oraHy, what right would Ame:ricaD.
negotiators have to trade away the ability of thousands of Hussein's victims to
see the dictator lJrought to justice? Finally, it is worth stressing that the duty to
aiguecl that Mr. Gonzales's position "reverse[s] over a century of U.S.. policy and practice in
supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine[s) the protections of the Iaw of war for our
troops, both in this specific conflict and in general." Memorandum from Colin L. Povvell, U.S.
Secretmy of State, to Alberto JR. Gonzales, Counsel to the Presidem, and Condoieezza Rice,
Assistant to the President for National Security .AHairs, at 2 (Jan. 26, 2002), C~1":tilcb!e at
http://www .humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/gov_rep/ go v_memc_inti aw. h tm.
134. Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President-, at 1 (Aug. l, 2002), availabie a! htip://www.
!mmanrightsfirst.org/us_!aw/etn/gov_rep/gov _memo_intlaw .htm.
135. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to be Allamey
General of the United States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judicial}', l 09th Cong. 507
(2005) (testimony of John D. Hutson, Dean and President of Franklin Pierce Law Center).
136. See Scharf, Can This Man Get a Fair Trial?, supra note 1 (noting that Iraqis "insisted,
over initial U.S. objections, on the inclusion of a provision ... that enables the [haqi Special
Tribunal] to prosecute Hussein for the crime of aggression").
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prosecute Hussein arising from these treaties did not require or even justify the
invasion of iraq. Rather, it merely prohibited actions that are manifestly
incompatible with the prosecution of Hussein, such as arranging for exile and
sanctuary in Bahrain.
The situation involving Charles Taylor is distinguishable. Taylor has been
charged by the Special Court for Sierra Leone with complicity in crirnes aga1i1st
humanity and war crimes in an internal anned conflict. As the Special Court
itself has recognized, since there is no treaty-based nor customary international
law duty to prosecute crimes against humanity or war crimes in an internal
conflict, an amnesty or exile-for-peace deal would not constitute a violation of
137
intemational1aw.
The distinction reflects the fact that, notwithstanding the natural lavv
rhetoric of jus co gens employed by proponents of a broad duty to prosecute, the
intemationallegal order is still governed by principles of positive iaw under u~he
357-year-old Westphalian concept of sovereignty. 138 State practice belies the
existence of a customary international law duty (based on the positive law
notion of state acquiescence to rules over time) to prosecute outside of the
treaty framework.
Consequently, the obligation to prosecute and the
cmTesponding duty to refrain from fn.listrating prosecution through amnesty or
exile applies only to certain treaty-based crimes vvhere the tTeaty sets forth such
an obligation and the affected states are party to the treaty at the time of tbe a.c~s
in question. Tlhis conclusion is analogous to that of the House of Lords in the
Pinochet case, in which the British High Court held thai the head of state
imlt11"!.mity doctrine prevented the United Kingdom fron'l extraditing io Spairn
former Chilean President Augusto lPinochet for crimes against humanity, with
the exception of crimes of torture coJnrlLmittedl after the U.K., Cb]£e, and .Sjp2jn
had!
ratified the Torture Convemtim1. 139 Thus, whilie ithere was a t.rea!:y-hchsed
duty ilo prosecui:e Saddlam Husseilill under the Geneva (Conven~iGT<S and
Genocide Convention, no si!Jich duty existed in the case of CR-w.rles Taylor. 'Nho
1vas accused of crimes against hu.n>Xil3Jnilty.
'finis does not memru l!l]_at 1:he Spedan Court for SieHa Leone hr,::; to honG·r
ths Charles T~ylior ;:;xiJe-for-peace: deal. Tlhe Special Court mc..de dear ;tJhat
amnesty and exiJe arrangements are on<ly binding within the state(s) gr;:mtnn~?
them. They do not apply to other stai:es OJr to international tribunals such as the
Special Court Moreover,. it is important to recognize that ami!esty, e:;~iie, a,w:l

an

137. Supra note 95 and accompanying text.
133. See Beaulac, supra note 99, at 14-8 (describing the origins of the state system in th'"
Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years ·war in 1648).
! 39. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. StipendiaFy Mlagistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte_ (I'! c. 3},
[2000] 1 A.C. 14-7, 148-49 (H.L. !999) (U.K.).
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sanctuary arnmgements are often temporary in nature. They are not a
permanent right of the recipient, but a privilege bestowed by the territorial state,
which can be revoked by a subsequent government or administration. The
trend in recent years is to use arrmesty and exile as a transitional step toward
eventual justice:, not as an enduring bar to justice. 140 As aU .S. Department of
State official explained with respect to Charles Taylor, "First we'll get him out
of Liberia, then we'll get him to the Court." 141

,t'

140. Peter A. Barcroft, The Slow Demise ofimpunity in Argemiua and Chile, (Jan. 2005),
http://www.asi!.org/insights/20D5/0l/insight050107.htm (reporting that Chile has revoked
JFinoche!'s immunity and initiated criminal proceedings ~J.gilinst him} (on file with the
Washington and Lee JLaw Review).
141. Lizza, supra note 6, at W. 'fbe European Parliament is ctmently pushing for the
adoption of a U.N. Security Council Resolution that would require i-Jigeria to sunender Taylor
to the Special Comt for Sierra Leone for prosecution. lBruce Zagaris, European Parliament
Passes Resolution Calling for Action to Ensure Taylor's Court Appearance, 21 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 200, 200 (2005). On November l!, 2005, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 1638, which expanded the mandate of the U.N. force in
Liberia to include apprehending Charles Taylor in the event that he returns to Liberia and to
transfer him to the Special Comt for Sierra Leone for prosecution. A.ithough the resolution did
not require Nigeria to revoke Taylor's asylum, it did pointedly refer to Taylor's asylum as a
"temporary stay" in Nigeria. S.C. Res. 1638, pmbl., 'Ill, U.N. Doc. S/FES/1638 (Nov. !1,
2005).

